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Banning the Bing: Why Extreme Solitary Confinement Is
Cruel and Far Too Usual Punishment
ELIZABETH BENNION*
To be kept in solitude is to be kept in pain, and put on the road to madness.
– E.O. Wilson1

The United States engages in extreme practices of solitary confinement that
maximize isolation and sensory deprivation of prisoners. The length is often indefinite
and can stretch for weeks, months, years, or decades. Under these conditions, both
healthy prisoners and those with preexisting mental-health issues often severely
deteriorate both mentally and physically. New science and data provide increased
insight into why and how human beings (and other social animals) deteriorate and
suffer in such environments. The science establishes that meaningful social contacts
and some level of opportunity for sensory enrichment are minimum human necessities.
When those necessities are denied, the high risks of serious harm apply to all prisoners,
no matter how seemingly resilient beforehand. Given these facts, this Article argues
that solitary confinement, as commonly practiced in the United States, is cruel and
unusual punishment—whether analyzed under current Supreme Court standards or an
improved framework. Furthermore, recently released data on states implementing
reforms shows that extreme solitary confinement tactics are counterproductive to
numerous policy interests, including public safety, institutional safety, prisoner
welfare, and cost efficiency. Both the scientific and the policy data suggest possible
avenues for effective reform.
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INTRODUCTION
When the door is locked against the prisoner, we do not think about what is behind it. . . .
Were we to enter the hidden world of punishment, we should be startled by what we see.
– Justice Anthony Kennedy2

The largest prisoner hunger strike in California’s history lasted sixty days and
ended on September 5, 2013.3 Involving approximately thirty thousand prisoners at
its peak, the protest’s central demand was over the state’s use of indefinite solitary
confinement that allows prisoners to be held for years, and even decades, in
isolation.4 As the strike stretched into its second month, dozens had been sent to
hospitals and infirmaries.5 By the final week, “nearly 10 protesters a day were
collapsing or otherwise required medical care.”6 The strikers won no major
concessions regarding solitary confinement but did gain the promise of legislative
hearings. At the end of the strike, protest leaders released a statement: “Our goal
remains: Force the powers that be to end their torture policies and practices in which
serious physical and psychological harm is inflicted on tens of thousands of
prisoners, as well as our loved ones outside.”7
While the strikers failed to accomplish their central goals, the strike did focus
national and international attention on the most troubling aspect of a deeply troubled
penal system. Solitary confinement, as currently practiced in the United States,
represents a serious miscalculation of the appropriate balance among prison security,
public safety, cost efficiency, and prisoner welfare. Indeed, the extreme solitary
confinement measures in this country promote none of those interests. The measures
also violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment
because they deny prisoners what science indicates are minimum human necessities.
Conditions of solitary confinement vary throughout the United States. But it is not
uncommon for prisoners to spend decades alone in windowless cement rooms with
perimeters approximately the size of a parking space or a king-sized bed for
twenty-three hours a day. Their meals may be pushed through slots of large, solid

2. Anthony M. Kennedy, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Speech at the American
Bar Association Annual Meeting 3 (Aug. 9, 2003), available at http://apps.americanbar.org
/irr/annual2003/kennedyspeech.pdf).
3. Paige St. John, California State Prisons Chief Says Inmates’ Hunger Strike Has
Ended, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2013), http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-ff-prisons
-chief-says-hunger-strike-has-ended-20130905,0,345517.story.
4. Paige St. John, Outside Look at Prison Hunger Strike, L.A. TIMES, July 27, 2013, at 1.
5. Sharon Bernstein, California Grapples with Inmate Illness as Hunger Strike Drags On,
NBCNEWS.COM, Aug. 16, 2013, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/08/16/20051427
-california-grapples-with-inmate-illness-as-hunger-strike-drags-on?lite.
6. Paige St. John, State Prison Hunger Strike Ends, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2013, at 1.
7. Id.
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metal doors—thus they eat, sleep, and defecate in spaces within a few feet of each
other.8 The one-hour “exercise” time might be in a cage on a concrete slab or in a
small, barren, concrete-enclosed pen that prisoners call a “dog run.”9 Prisoners may
go years without seeing more of the outdoors than a small patch of sky and without
being physically touched by another human being other than when placed in
constraints, such as handcuffs and chains.10 While they may hear echoing shouts of
other prisoners, there is no opportunity for normal conversation or association with
others from the confines of their cells.11 They generally also have no access to
rehabilitative programs.12 It is important to note at the outset that when this Article
speaks of “solitary confinement,” it is not simply referring to housing an inmate in
his or her own single-occupancy cell—it is referring to all these associated types of
extreme measures to provide isolation and sensory deprivation.
In this extreme environment, many prisoners suffer serious psychological and
physical deterioration. Prisoners entering solitary confinement with mental-health
issues often find those issues severely exacerbated. Prisoners entering without
mental-health issues often acquire acute mental illness during their stay.13 In
California, 2% of the prison population is housed in isolation, and yet that 2%
accounted for 42% of all prison suicides from 2006 to 2010.14 Long-term isolation
can also contribute to dramatically increased costs and increased “assaultive or antisocial behavior”; it can “result in negative outcomes for institutional safety, and
increase the risk of recidivism after release.”15
Given the extremely negative effects of solitary confinement on prisoners
themselves and on larger policy goals, there has been a growing groundswell for
reform—spurred at least in part by a much smaller prisoner hunger strike in 2011.16
For example, the U.S. Senate held its first congressional hearings on the issue in June
2012 and February 2014, with the lead senator calling for reforms.17 The U.N. special

8. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1229 (N.D. Cal. 1995); Reassessing Solitary
Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 112th Cong. 20–21 (2012) [hereinafter Solitary Confinement Hearing I] (statement
of Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
9. Craig Haney, Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and “Supermax”
Confinement, 49 CRIME & DELINQ. 126, 126 (2003).
10. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 20 (statement of Craig Haney,
Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
11. Haney, supra note 9, at 127.
12. Madrid, 889 F. Supp. at 1262.
13. Stuart Grassian, Psychiatric Effects of Solitary Confinement, 22 WASH. U. J.L. POL’Y
325, 333 (2006) (“I have observed that, for many of the inmates so housed, incarceration in
solitary caused either severe exacerbation or recurrence of preexisting illness, or the appearance
of acute mental illness in individuals who had previously been free of any such illness.”).
14. Editorial, Striking Against Solitude, WASH. POST, Aug. 4, 2013, at A18.
15. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 712 (written statement of Michael
Jacobson, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice).
16. See California Prison Hunger Strike: 30,000 Inmates Refuse Meals, HUFFINGTON
POST (July 10, 2013, 2:30 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/09/california-prison
-hunger-strike-30000_n_3567639.html.
17. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8; Reassessing Solitary Confinement II: The
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rapporteur on torture urged the United States to abolish prolonged solitary
confinement (defined as anything more than fifteen days)—which he argued could
amount to torture.18 Other influential organizations voicing opposition to the current
state of affairs include the American Bar Association, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, the European Court
for Human Rights, the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, the
National Alliance of Mental Illness, the Vera Institute of Justice, and others.19
Several states have begun reforms, but many resist the growing tide of change.20
Thus, at least parts of the nation seem presently poised for genuine reform efforts.
But there are obstacles to those reform efforts as well: creating more humane
conditions for prisoners is not generally seen as a popular position for politicians;
among the general population, there is a lack of scientific understanding regarding
the extent and severity of solitary confinement’s potential effects; a culture of harsh
punishment predominates in many modern prisons;21 and there is a widespread
legislative and judicial hesitancy to interfere with matters of prison security and
administration—presumably over fear of unforeseen results. So, for example, one
federal judge found that certain solitary-confinement conditions did “press the outer
bounds of what most humans can psychologically tolerate,” and yet he refused to
find the conditions cruel and unusual for all inmates.22 It is this type of hesitancy that

Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014),
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/reassessing-solitary-confinement-ii-the
-human-rights-fiscal-and-public-safety-consequences.
18. Press Release, Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, California Jails: “Solitary
Confinement Can Amount to Cruel Punishment, Even Torture”—UN Rights Expert (Aug. 23,
2013), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID
=13655&LangID=E (quoting Special Rapporteur Juan E. Mendez).
19. See, e.g., Brittany Glidden, Necessary Suffering?: Weighing Government and
Prisoner Interests in Determining What Is Cruel and Unusual, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1815,
1825–26 (2012); see also Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at III–V.
20. See ACLU, STATE REFORMS TO LIMIT THE USE OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2013),
available at http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/state_reforms_to_limit_the_use_of_solitary
_confinement.pdf; Sal Rodriguez, FAQ, SOLITARY WATCH (2012), http://solitarywatch.com
/facts/faq/.
21. Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Mississippi, has
become a proponent of reform and was one of those called to testify before the Senate Hearing
on Solitary Confinement in June 2012, but he admitted that at one time he did believe difficult
inmates should be locked down as tightly as possible for as long as possible: “That was the
culture, and I was part of it,” he said. Erica Goode, Rethinking Solitary Confinement: States
Ease Isolation, Saving Money, Lives and Inmate Sanity, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at A1.
22. Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146, 1267 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The judge who refused
to find the conditions cruel and unusual for all inmates housed in a particular prison’s solitary
confinement stressed that the opinion was
based on the current record and data before us. We can not begin to speculate on
the impact that [these solitary] conditions may have on inmates confined . . . for
periods of 10 or 20 years or more; the inmates studied in connection with this
action had generally been confined . . . for three years or less.
Id.
At the time that opinion was written, the “record and data” were necessarily limited because
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likely prompted Justice Kennedy’s admonition that “[c]ourts may not allow
constitutional violations to continue simply because a remedy would involve
intrusion into the realm of prison administration.”23
This Article addresses these obstacles by examining the increasing scientific
evidence of the severely debilitating effects of isolation and sensory deprivation,
explaining why the science requires finding the current practices cruel and unusual,
and discussing the emerging data regarding the societal effects of reform. This is a
particularly opportune time to make the analysis due to the explosive growth in
neuroscientific research, the wealth of evidence produced from a variety of sources
for the 2012 and 2014 Senate hearings, and the recent reform efforts of some states
that provide new insight regarding societal effects of a change in course. The data
also suggests what types of reforms could effectively redefine solitary-confinement
policies within constitutional bounds.
This Article first examines the history of U.S. solitary confinement, including why
a penal system that is desperately overcrowded and underfunded turned to a method
that exacerbates both crowding and cost issues. Part III considers the effects of
isolation and sensory deprivation, drawing on both studies of prisoners and studies
of humans and animals in other contexts of isolation. It highlights that there is
increasingly no clear line between physical and psychological harm. Part IV explains
the jurisprudence surrounding the Eighth Amendment as it applies to prison
conditions and some potential improvements. It then argues that under either the
current or an improved standard, solitary confinement (as commonly currently
practiced in the United States) is cruel and unusual. This argument is based on the
scientific evidence that extreme isolation and sensory deprivation constitute a denial
of minimum human necessities. Part V examines alternative solutions, including
evidence from recent experiments with reforming solitary-confinement programs
and the effect on different policy interests. The Article concludes with proposed
changes that would appropriately balance prison-security needs with public safety,
public funding, and prisoner-welfare obligations, while avoiding cruel and unusual
punishment prohibitions.
I. THE HISTORY OF SOLITARY CONFINEMENT
I believe that very few men are capable of estimating the immense amount of torture and
agony which this dreadful punishment, prolonged for years, inflicts upon the sufferers . . . . I

the prison facility at issue had only existed for approximately five years. Id. at 1155. But by 2011,
more than five hundred inmates in that same facility had spent over a decade in solitary
confinement, more than two hundred had spent more than fifteen years there, and seventy-eight
had been there more than twenty years. AMNESTY INT’L., USA: THE EDGE OF ENDURANCE: PRISON
CONDITIONS IN CALIFORNIA’S SECURITY HOUSING UNITS 2 (2012), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/sites/default/files/edgeofendurancecaliforniareport.pdf. Louisiana
holds the record for the longest terms served in solitary confinement in the United States.
Herman Wallace’s forty-one years in isolation ended in October 2013 when his conviction
was overturned—he died a few days later. His codefendant, Albert Woodfox, also had his
conviction overturned but remains in solitary confinement pending the state’s appeal. David
Cole, Decades in Solitary, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2013, at A19.
23. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1928−29 (2011).
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hold this slow and daily tampering with the mysteries of the brain, to be immeasurably worse
than any torture of the body . . . .
– Charles Dickens after an 1842 visit to the Cherry Hill prison, which was
experimenting with extreme isolation techniques24

There are a host of names for it: the bing, the hole, the hotbox, the SHU (Secure
Housing Unit), the block, the cooler, the pound, lockdown, 23/7, SCU (Solitary
Confinement Unit), Administrative Segregation (AdSeg), isolation, separation, cellular,
Supermax (Super-Maximum Security Confinement), communications-management
unit, control unit, disciplinary-housing unit, intensive-management unit, special
management, security housing, close management, high security, closed-cell restriction,
etc.25 The precise number of inmates housed at any one time in solitary confinement
in the United States is unknown—but in 2005, it was a number well over 80,000.26
That figure qualifies the United States as holding “far more prisoners in segregation
or solitary than any other democratic nation.”27
It was not always thus. The first experiments with long-term isolation in the
United States were associated with the idea that forcing an inmate into silence and
moral reflection would aid in rehabilitation and reformation of the prisoner.
Philadelphia opened Eastern State Penitentiary (or “Cherry Hill”) in 1826 using the
“silent system,” where prisoners were forbidden to speak, kept alone in their cells,
and required to wear hoods over their heads during exercise. The Cherry Hill model
was an “international sensation”—inspiring similar models across the nation and
around the globe.28
But the fad did not last long. First, the prisons were extremely expensive to
maintain. Second, officials and visitors noted extensive mental-health issues among

24. CHARLES DICKENS, AMERICAN NOTES FOR GENERAL CIRCULATION 146–47 (John S.
Whitley & Arnold Goldman eds., Penguin Books 1972) (1842).
25. See, e.g., Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 83 (written statement of
Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz); U.N. Special
Rapporteur, Interim Report of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, at 8–9, U.N. Doc. A/66/268 (Aug. 5, 2011); Ken
Strutin, Solitary Confinement, LLRX.COM (Aug. 10, 2010), http://www.llrx.com/features
/solitaryconfinement.htm.
26. According to a 2005 Bureau of Justice Statistics census (the most recent data
available), the number of people held in solitary confinement was 81,622. But this number did
not include detention centers, Immigration and Customs Enforcement facilities, Bureau of
Indian Affairs facilities, U.S. Marshals Service facilities, military facilities, and facilities that
house only juveniles. It included data from all federal facilities and forty-nine state facilities.
See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 711 (written statement of Michael
Jacobson, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice); Angela Browne, Alissa Cambier
& Suzanne Agha, Prisons Within Prisons: The Use of Segregation in the United States, 24
FED. SENT’G REP. 46 (2011).
27. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Dick
Durbin, Chairman, Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights).
28. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Jeff George, The Ninth Circle of Hell: An Eighth
Amendment Analysis of Imposing Prolonged Supermax Solitary Confinement on Inmates with
a Mental Illness, 90 DENV. U. L. REV. 1, 10 (2012) (quoting NORMAN JOHNSTON, FORMS OF
CONSTRAINT: A HISTORY OF PRISON ARCHITECTURE 74 (2000)).
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the populations of these new types of prisons. In the 1830s, there were reports of
hallucinations, dementia, and monomania in Cherry Hill prisoners.29 A prison that
had adopted the Cherry Hill model in Britain reported that “a very extraordinary
increase ha[d] taken place in the number of insane prisoners in the prison” and
recommended that inmates “should be placed together and ‘have the privilege of
conversation.’”30 Following an 1831 visit to a New York prison experimenting with
isolation, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote: “This absolute solitude, if nothing interrupts
it, is beyond the strength of man. . . . It does not reform, it kills.”31
This combination of expense and disturbing mental health effects caused “every
state that tried the Pennsylvania model between 1830 and 1880 [to] subsequently
abandon[] it within a few years,”32 except Cherry Hill itself, which continued its
model until 1913. It seemed the United States had tried a failed experiment and would
not repeat it. Indeed, in 1890 the Supreme Court observed that society had found
prolonged solitary confinement to be “too severe.”33 Speaking of several states’
experiments with isolation of prisoners, the Court explained:
But experience demonstrated that there were serious objections to it. A
considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement,
into a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to
arouse them, and others became violently insane, others, still, committed
suicide, while those who stood the ordeal better were not generally
reformed, and in most cases did not recover sufficient mental activity to
be of any subsequent service to the community.34
Further evidence that made it seem prolonged solitary confinement was
permanently in the nation’s past included a 1939 prison psychiatric report declaring
the practice to be no longer adopted in any “civilized nation.”35 And the American
Correctional Association’s 1959 Manual of Correctional Standards instructed that
solitary confinement should only be used as a last resort and never last more than
fifteen days; usually, a much shorter period would be sufficient. It also stressed that
even during these relatively short periods of isolation, prisoners must be provided
with group or individual therapy to safeguard mental health.36
Given prolonged solitary confinement’s dismal record, why did the United States
once again turn to its widespread use beginning in the 1980s? There were four
important and interrelated precursors, the first being the explosive growth of the
prisoner population beginning in the late 1970s. In 1978, there were 307,276 inmates

29. Id. at 11.
30. Id. (quoting Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison
Inmates: A Brief History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 458 (2006)).
31. Ruth Marcus, Why Are We Subjecting Our Youths to Solitary Confinement?, WASH.
POST (Oct. 16, 2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-10-16/opinions/35501106_1
_solitary-confinement-new-york-prison-adult-facilities (quoting Alexis de Tocqueville).
32. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 11–12.
33. In re Medley, 134 U.S. 160, 168 (1890).
34. Id.
35. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 12.
36. Id.
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in state and federal prisons37—a number that had held relatively stable for fifty
years.38 By the end of 2012, that number was 1,571,013—an increase of over 400
percent.39 Add in the local-jail figures, and the number increases to over 2.3 million
people.40 Thus, although the United States has only 5% of the world’s population, it
has 25% of the world’s prisoners. Those 2.3 million represent by far the most
prisoners per capita of any democratic nation in the world.41 In 2009, a study reported
that one in every thirty-one adults in the United States was in prison, on probation,
or on parole.42
Funding for larger prisons, more prisons, and more staff did not keep pace with this
dramatic increase in population.43 Prisons across the nation deal with severe
overcrowding issues. A 2014 report stated that federal facilities in fiscal-year 2013
operated at 36% above capacity, and high- and medium-security facilities operated at
52% and 45% above capacity respectively.44 States from coast to coast are also dealing
with severe overcrowding—most notoriously California, which is currently being
forced by the U.S. Supreme Court to reduce its population to 137.5 percent of capacity.45
Another important precursor to the resurrection of prolonged isolation was the
widespread closing of mental-health hospitals that began around the 1960s and
prompted the creation of a new term in the 1990s: “transinstitutionalization,”
meaning the transfer of mentally ill patients from state hospitals to jails.46 Currently,

37. Erica Goode, U.S. Prison Populations Decline, Reflecting New Approach to Crime,
N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2013, at A11.
38. See Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 13.
39. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2012—ADVANCE COUNTS (2013), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12ac.pdf. In 2009, that number reached a high of
1,615,487—the last several years have shown an overall decline. See id.
40. See TODD D. MINTON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2012—STATISTICAL TABLES (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov
/content/pub/pdf/jim12st.pdf.
41. See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 30–31.
42. Solomon Moore, Study Shows High Cost of Criminal Corrections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
3, 2009, at A13.
43. See J.C. Oleson, Comment, The Punitive Coma, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 829, 832 (2002)
(citing Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, at 51).
44. NATHAN JAMES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION
BUILDUP: OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS (2014), available at
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42937.pdf. However, at the 2014 Senate hearing, the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons stated that currently the federal system operates at
32% above capacity generally and 51% above capacity in high-security prisons. Reassessing
Solitary Confinement II: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and Public Safety Consequences: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights & Human Rights of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2014), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media
/doc/02-25-14SamuelsTestimony.pdf (statement of Charles E. Samuels, Jr., Director, Federal
Bureau of Prisons).
45. Adam Banner, Stitching Up a Paper Cut: Eric Holder Is ‘Fixing’ a Federal Problem
at the Expense of the States, HUFFINGTON POST (Oct. 15, 2013, 5:12 AM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/adam-banner/eric-holder-drug-policy_b_3758421.html.
46. Elizabeth Bennion, A Right To Remain Psychotic? A New Standard for Involuntary
Treatment in Light of Current Science, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 251, 261 (2013).
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the three largest inpatient psychiatric facilities in the country are not hospitals, but
jails: Los Angeles County Jail, Rikers Island Jail in New York, and Cook County Jail
in Illinois.47 In 2012, one Chicago sheriff lamented that his jail housed two thousand
mentally ill prisoners, while the largest state mental-health facility had only 582
beds—and he predicted the situation would soon worsen with the city’s imminent
plan to shut down six of its twelve mental-health centers.48 A mentally ill person is
three times more likely to be incarcerated than hospitalized in the United States.49 A
2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics report stated that 56% of state prisoners, 45% of
federal prisoners, and 64% of local jail inmates had mental-health problems.50 The
rate of those with severe mental illness is lower—in 2000, the American Psychiatric
Association estimated up to 20% of prisoners were severely mentally ill and up to
5% were “actively psychotic at any given moment.”51
A third precursor was the 1970s’ surprisingly swift abandonment of “the central
justification for imprisonment—the pursuit of the rehabilitative ideal—that had been
in place for nearly a century.”52 During this period, there was a flurry of criticism of
rehabilitation as a penal goal. Sociologist Robert Martinson was among the most
influential critics. He stated that “[w]ith few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative
efforts that have been reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism.”53
Despite the fact that Martinson later recanted, concluding his own methodology
had been flawed,54 his initial criticism helped spawn a “nothing works” movement
that “within a few short years, [convinced] many penologists and prison
administrators across the country . . . [of] the stunning conclusion that any attempt
to facilitate positive change inside prison was fundamentally flawed and doomed to
fail.”55 Many politicians, scholars, and judges also joined this bandwagon.56 They
supported abandoning rehabilitation not only because of the high rates of recidivism
but also because of concerns that rehabilitation could lead to large discrepancies

47. Nation’s Jails Struggle with Mentally Ill Prisoners, NPR (Sept. 4, 2011, 2:53 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2011/09/04/140167676/nations-jails-struggle-with-mentally-ill-prisoners.
48. Bridget O’Shea, Psychiatric Patients with No Place To Go but Jail, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
19, 2012, at A25A.
49. Bennion, supra note 46, at 261.
50. DORIS J. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES (2006), available at
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
51. Peter Scharff Smith, The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief
History and Review of the Literature, 34 CRIME & JUST. 441, 453 (2006).
52. Craig Haney, Demonizing the “Enemy”: The Role of “Science” in Declaring the
“War on Prisoners,” 9 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 185, 186 (2010).
53. Id. at 209 (quoting Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974, at 22, 25 (1974)).
54. See JOSEPH T. HALLINAN, GOING UP THE RIVER: TRAVELS IN A PRISON NATION 36 (2001).
55. Haney, supra note 52, at 209–10. Some argue that wardens and commissioners were
not suddenly convinced that rehabilitation did not work but that a wave of retirements allowed
a new generation of leaders to assume control of prisons—leaders who had less understanding
of prisoners and rehabilitation. See generally DANIEL GLASER, PREPARING CONVICTS FOR
LAW-ABIDING LIVES (1995).
56. See Oleson, supra note 43, at 841.
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among sentences or to indeterminate sentencing.57 There was also the philosophical
challenge of whether it was a defensible position to “lock[] people up until they
become better people.”58
When rehabilitation was swept aside, the predominant penal theories that filled the
void were incapacitation and retribution59—the latter renamed “just deserts” for easier
public consumption.60 “Prisons were no longer designed to cure; they were intended to
be aversive and unpleasant.”61 It was far easier to justify harsh conditions of solitary
confinement if the predominant penal goal was punishment and incapacitation rather
than rehabilitation. Also, the lack of rehabilitation programs created a void of
meaningful and productive activities for the inmates and contributed to the final and
most important precursor to the resurgence of solitary confinement.
That final precursor was violence. Overcrowding, combined with an extreme
influx of mentally ill inmates (who often have trouble regimenting their behavior
within the strict rules of a prison environment due to their illness) and an extreme
decrease in any rehabilitative programs (creating large-scale and unprecedented
idleness), provided for a dangerous dynamic in prisons.62 Solitary confinement was
the prison officials’ answer to an increasingly difficult-to-control, violent, and
gang-dominated prison population.63
Dr. Terry Kupers, a prominent expert on the effects of solitary confinement,
explained that
[i]nstead of arriving at the obvious correct conclusion . . . that the
crowding and idleness caused serious damage and needed to be reversed
. . . and educational and training programs needed to be reinstituted and
strengthened, corrections authorities instead opted to place the blame for
the uncontrollable violence on a new breed of prisoners,
“super-predators,” and proceeded to place a growing proportion of those
they vilified as “the worst of the worst” in round-the-clock solitary
confinement.64
The origin of the modern U.S. supermax facility—where “conditions typically
include solitary confinement twenty-three hours each day in a barren
environment”65—can be traced to particular events in October 1983. The location was
the U.S. penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, a maximum-security prison that had replaced

57. See Graham Hughes, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social
Purpose, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1322, 1322–23 (1982) (book review).
58. Id. at 1323.
59. Oleson, supra note 43, at 841.
60. Ernest van den Haag, Punishment: Desert and Crime Control, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1250,
1250 (1987) (reviewing ANDREW VON HIRSCH, PAST OR FUTURE CRIMES: DESERVEDNESS AND
DANGEROUSNESS IN THE SENTENCING OF CRIMINALS (1985)).
61. Oleson, supra note 43, at 841.
62. See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 28–29.
63. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 213 (2005).
64. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 495–96 (written statement of Dr.
Terry Kupers, Institute Professor, The Wright Institute).
65. Smith, supra note 51, at 443.
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the controversial prison at Alcatraz.66 Violence had been steadily rising at the prison
in recent years and culminated in the murders of two prison guards in separate events
on a single day.67 Four days later, an inmate was also found murdered.68 Shortly
thereafter, the warden declared a state of emergency and put the entire prison on a
twenty-three hour-a-day lockdown status. The lockdown was not lifted—and thus a
maximum-security prison was transformed into the first “supermax.”69
Prolonged solitary confinement became known as the “Marion Model,” and both
the federal government and many states built their own supermax facilities in the
years that followed.70 By 2004, a study reported that forty-four states had supermaxes
housing approximately 25,000 inmates71 (a sizable percentage of the 80,000-plus
inmates in solitary confinement throughout the United States).72 “Few, if any,
rehabilitation or education programs exist in supermaxes.”73
Although conditions and definitions vary among supermax facilities, over 95% of
state prison wardens agreed with the following definition: “A supermax is a
stand-alone unit or part of another facility and is designated for violent or disruptive
inmates. It typically involves up to 23-hour-per-day, single-cell confinement for an
indefinite period of time. Inmates in supermax housing have minimal contact with
staff and other inmates.”74
Again, over 95% of state wardens agreed that the primary goals of supermax
prisons include “increasing safety, order, and control throughout prison systems and
incapacitating violent or disruptive inmates.”75 There was much less consensus on
other potential goals.76

66. Craig Haney & Mona Lynch, Regulating Prisons of the Future: A Psychological Analysis
of Supermax and Solitary Confinement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 477, 489 (1997).
67. Scott N. Tachiki, Indeterminate Sentences in Supermax Prisons Based upon Alleged
Gang Affiliations: A Reexamination of Procedural Protection and a Proposal for Greater
Procedural Requirements, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1995).
68. Gertrude Strassburger, Judicial Inaction and Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Are
Super-Maximum Walls Too High for the Eighth Amendment?, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 199, 202 (2001).
69. Tachiki, supra note 67, at 1122−23. However, this particular institution no longer
functions as a supermax facility. It was downgraded in 2006 to medium security. Justin Peters,
How a 1983 Murder Created America’s Terrible Supermax-Prison Culture, SLATE (Oct. 23,
2013, 3:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/crime/2013/10/23/marion_prison_lockdown
_thomas_silverstein_how_a_1983_murder_created_america.html.
70. Strassburger, supra note 68, at 202.
71. DANIEL P. MEARS, URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., EVALUATING THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF SUPERMAX PRISONS, at ii (2006), available at http://www.urban.org
/uploadedPDF/411326_supermax_prisons.pdf.
72. See Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 711 (written statement of
Michael Jacobson, President and Director, Vera Institute of Justice).
73. Terry A. Kupers, Isolated Confinement: Effective Method for Behavior Change or
Punishment for Punishment’s Sake?, in THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
CRIME AND JUSTICE STUDIES 213, 213 (Bruce A. Arrigo & Heather Y. Bersot eds., 2014).
74. MEARS, supra note 71, at ii.
75. Id.
76. See id. (“There is less agreement about whether they improve inmate behavior throughout
prison systems; decrease riots, the influence of gangs, or escapes; successfully punish, reduce the
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Supermax prisons can be two-to-three times more expensive to build and operate
than traditional maximum-security prisons.77 Each one represents “close to [a] $1
billion investment over 30 to 40 years, the typical life span of a prison.”78 A 2009
Pew study examining state and federal data found that criminal correction spending
outpaced budget growth in all areas but Medicaid, which had quadrupled over the
past two decades.79
While isolation units (whether in supermaxes or elsewhere) are often advertised
as housing only the “worst of the worst,” the reality is quite different.80 Prisoners in
solitary confinement are generally housed there for one of three purposes: (1) to
protect them from threats they would be subject to in the general population (children
in adult prisons are among those who may fall in this category81); (2) to punish
noncompliance with prison rules; or (3) to control individuals perceived as a current
or future threat.82 In most isolation units, those with serious records of violence in
the prison itself “are the exception rather than the rule.”83 Many are housed there for
an unacceptable number of minor rule violations or for suspected gang membership.
The allegation of gang membership may result in indefinite solitary confinement—
even when “the prisoners in question may not have engaged in any overt rule
violations other than their alleged connection to the gang, and may remain entirely
free of disciplinary write-ups during the many years of their indefinite isolation.”84
A highly disproportionate number of those in solitary confinement are severely
mentally ill. Many of the symptoms of severe mental illness can make it difficult to
conform to the highly regimented rules and procedures of the prison environment.
Thus, prison officials “often ‘treat disordered behavior as disorderly behavior.’”85
This may happen even with minor infractions, for many of the state and federal
policies regarding who may be placed in solitary are extremely vague and open
ended—for example, one state’s policies allowed solitary confinement if the inmate
was unpredictable or “difficult to manage in other prison settings.”86 One former
prisoner “recalled being put in solitary confinement for petty annoyances like

recidivism of, or rehabilitate violent or disruptive inmates; or deter crime in society.”).
77. See infra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
78. MEARS, supra note 71, at 46.
79. Moore, supra note 42.
80. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 45.
81. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GROWING UP LOCKED DOWN 20 (2012), available at
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us1012ForUpload.pdf.
82. HOPE METCALF, JAMELIA MORGAN, SAMUEL OLIKER-FRIEDLAND, JUDITH RESNIK, JULIA
SPIEGEL, HARAN TAE, ALYSSA WORK & BRIAN HOLBROOK, ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION,
DEGREES OF ISOLATION, AND INCARCERATION: A NATIONAL OVERVIEW OF STATE AND FEDERAL
CORRECTIONAL POLICIES 2 (2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Administrative
%20Segregation,%20Degrees%20of%20Isolation,%20and%20Incarceration.pdf.
83. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 78 (written statement of Craig
Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
84. Id.
85. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 48–49 (quoting Developments in the Law:
The Law of Mental Illness, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1114, 1145 (2008)).
86. Id. at 48 (quoting David Lovell, Kristin Cloyes, David Allen & Lorna Rhodes, Who
Lives in Super-Maximum Custody? A Washington State Study, FED. PROBATION, Dec. 2000, at
33, 37); see also METCALF ET AL., supra note 82, at 5–11.
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refusing to get out of the shower quickly enough.”87 Thus, imposition of solitary
confinement is ultimately at the discretion of prison administrators and may last for
days, weeks, months, years, or decades—and is often simply indefinite.
While it is difficult to provide a precise definition of modern solitary confinement
in the United States because of the varying conditions across the nation, there are
some general trends. Inmates are generally confined alone in cells that range in
dimension from sixty to eighty square feet for approximately twenty-three hours a
day.88 The cells generally contain a bunk, a toilet, and a sink, and ventilation is often
substandard.89 Exercise is usually limited to one hour a day alone in often small,
barren exercise rooms. Prisoners “are kept under constant surveillance with
‘computerized locking and tracking systems [used to] allow their movement to be
regulated with a minimum of human interaction.’”90 Contact visits are generally
prohibited as are all work, rehabilitation, or other activities and programs.91 If
mental-health treatment is provided, it may be through the small portal at their cell
front.92 “The norm is to impose, to the fullest extent possible, complete sensory
deprivation and social isolation.”93
II. EFFECTS OF ISOLATION AND SENSORY DEPRIVATION ON THE
BRAIN, BODY, AND BEHAVIOR
It’s an awful thing, solitary . . . . It crushes your spirit and weakens your resistance more
effectively than any other form of mistreatment.
– Senator John McCain, who spent more than two years in isolation in a fifteen-by-fifteen
cell during his five and a half years as a prisoner of war in Vietnam94

Senator John McCain’s assertion that solitary is the worst form of mistreatment
came “from a man who was beaten regularly; denied adequate medical treatment for
two broken arms, a broken leg, and chronic dysentery; and tortured to the point of
having an arm broken again.”95 A study of one group of former Vietnam War
prisoners also “reported that they found social isolation to be as torturous and
agonizing as any physical abuse they suffered”—and many had suffered worse
physical abuse than Senator McCain.96
Terry Anderson, an Associated Press reporter who was held hostage for seven
years by Hezbollah in Lebanon, explained that when he was housed with other

87. Atul Gawande, Hellhole, NEW YORKER, Mar. 30, 2009, at 36, 39.
88. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 75 (written statement of Craig
Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
89. Id. at 75–76.
90. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 16 (alteration in original) (quoting Haney,
supra note 9, at 126).
91. Id. at 17; see also Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 21 (statement of
Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
92. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 17.
93. Id.
94. Gawande, supra note 87, at 38.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 38–39.
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hostages his ability to concentrate, to read, to avoid hallucinations, and to control his
emotions all improved. But when he was imprisoned for indefinite periods alone, he
could feel his mind disintegrating: his sleep patterns changed; he became neurotically
possessive and emotionally unstable; and his abilities to concentrate, remember, and
process information were all severely limited. He would sometimes physically
tremble without cause and begin to fear that he would lose his mind and all control.
After three years of captivity he did lose control and began beating his head against
a wall—his head was smashed and bleeding by the time guards stopped his sudden
self-violence.97
Another hostage who had been a private-school director was placed in solitary
confinement for four months before being housed with Anderson. The director had
become severely withdrawn—lying for hours facing a wall in a semicatatonic state.
He seemed unable to follow even simple instructions from the guards, which resulted
in the guards often becoming abusive with him. Upon his release after three and a
half years, he had to be placed in a psychiatric hospital.98
These examples illustrate what studies show—that solitary confinement is dangerous
to the mental health of all individuals, whether they previously experienced
mental-health issues or not (though previous vulnerabilities increase the risk).99 “[W]hen
inmates are subjected to extensive cell confinement and deprivation of activities and
stimulation, a majority can be expected to report moderate to serious psychological
symptoms.”100 Add isolation to the mix, and the prevalence rates grow even higher.101
Why would simply leaving someone alone in a confined space for a prolonged
period equate to a form of torture for these prisoners?
The answer at least partially lies in the nature of the human brain. When compared
to the brains of other animals, humans have a much larger brain relative to body size.
The best predictor of brain size in the animal kingdom is the size of a species’ social
group. In other words, “[w]e have big brains in order to socialize.”102
Neuroscientists have discovered that when the brain is not involved in an active
task, it automatically falls into a neural configuration named the “default network,”
which is almost identical to the brain configuration used for social thinking. One
neuroscientist explained that the primary purpose of the brain seems to be social

97. Id. at 38 (citing TERRY ANDERSON, DEN OF LIONS (1993)).
98. Id.
99. Hafemeister & George, supra note 28, at 25.
100. Haney, supra note 9, at 135 (quoting Stanley L. Brodsky & Forrest R. Scogin, Inmates
in Protective Custody: First Data on Emotional Effects, 1 FORENSIC REP. 267, 279 (1988)).
101. See id. at 135–37 (observing that prisoners in isolation had an average of 14.5 percent
higher prevalence of damaging psychological symptoms than the already high rates for those
in protective housing who had limited access to activities and stimulation). One scholar
surveying the associated literature wrote: “Research suggests that between one-third and more
than 90 percent experience adverse symptoms in solitary confinement, and a significant
amount of this suffering is caused or worsened by solitary confinement.” Smith, supra note
51, at 502 (2006).
102. Emily Esfahani Smith, Social Connection Makes a Better Brain, ATLANTIC (Oct. 29,
2013, 1:00 PM) http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/10/social-connection-makes
-a-better-brain/280934/?single_page=true.
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thinking: “Evolution has made a bet . . . that the best thing for our brain to do in any
spare moment is to get ready for what comes next in social terms.”103
Neuropsychologists have also called the brain an “infovore,” as it constantly
craves new information through the senses. The natural world to which the brain is
accustomed is one of rich sensory stimulation. One theory is that it is human nature
to love learning because novel, interpretable stimuli cause significant neural activity
in the temporal lobe, producing greater quantities of endorphins.104
Thus, social thinking and sensory interpretation are fundamental brain activities
on which a healthy brain thrives. But what exactly happens to brain, body, and
behavior when a person is deprived of opportunities to have meaningful social
connections or a sensory-rich environment? Scientists are currently seeking answers
to those questions. For example, recent studies have noted that perceived social
isolation (loneliness) is associated with decreased activity in regions of the brain
associated with empathy, learning, and rewards;105 is linked to an increased risk of
dementia in later life;106 may impact sleep patterns;107 and is associated with lower
rates of physical and mental health.108 It has also long been established that if all
sight, sound, and tactile sensations are eliminated, people may enter a hallucinatory
state in as little as forty-eight hours.109
Social isolation is as strong a risk factor for morbidity and mortality as are
smoking, obesity, a sedentary lifestyle, and high blood pressure. When this was first
discovered, it spawned the “social control hypothesis”—the assumption that the link
between isolation and adverse health effects was due to external pressures from the
social network to have better health behaviors. However, more recent studies have

103. Id.
104. See DIANA ARIAS & CHRISTIAN OTTO, NASA, DEFINING THE SCOPE OF SENSORY
DEPRIVATION FOR LONG DURATION SPACE MISSIONS 20 (2011) [hereinafter NASA REPORT]; C.A.
OTTO, SOUTH POLE STATION: AN ANALOGUE FOR HUMAN PERFORMANCE DURING LONG
DURATION MISSIONS TO ISOLATED AND CONFINED ENVIRONMENTS (2007) (abstract available at
http://www.dsls.usra.edu/meetings/hrp2008/pdf/BehavHealth/1150Otto.pdf); Irving Biederman
& Edward A. Vessel, Perceptual Pleasure and the Brain, 94 AM. SCIENTIST 249 (2006).
105. See John T. Cacioppo, Catherine J. Norris, Jean Decety, George Monteleone
& Howard Nusbaum, In the Eye of the Beholder: Individual Differences in Perceived Social
Isolation Predict Regional Brain Activation to Social Stimuli, 21 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE
83, 83–84 (2009).
106. See Tjalling Jan Holwerda, Dorly J. H. Deeg, Aartjan T. F. Beekman, Theo G. van
Tilburg, Max L. Stek, Cees Jonker & Robert A. Schoevers, Feelings of Loneliness, but Not
Social Isolation, Predict Dementia Onset: Results from the Amsterdam Study of the Elderly
(AMSTEL), 85 J. NEUROLOGY NEUROSURGERY & PSYCHIATRY 135 (2014).
107. See Lianne M. Kurina, Kristen L. Knutson, Louise C. Hawkley, John T. Cacioppo,
Diane S. Lauderdale & Carole Ober, Loneliness Is Associated with Sleep Fragmentation in a
Communal Society, 34 SLEEP 1519 (2011).
108. See Erin York Cornwell & Linda J. Waite, Social Disconnectedness, Perceived
Isolation, and Health Among Older Adults, 50 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 31 (2009).
109. Jeffrey Smith McLeod, Note, Anxiety, Despair, and the Maddening Isolation of
Solitary Confinement: Invoking the First Amendment’s Protection Against State Action That
Invades the Sphere of the Intellect and Spirit, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 647, 653 (2009).
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caused scientists to reject this theory as insufficient to explain the wide variety of
harms that occur in an isolation environment.110
This Part examines the evidence regarding social isolation and sensory
deprivation’s effects by surveying modern prisoner studies and studies of such
deprivations in other contexts.
A. Modern Prisoner Studies
There are inherent difficulties with performing studies on prisoner populations,
especially those housed in solitary confinement. Most obviously, there is the problem
of access. But even if that hurdle is surmounted, if one is studying the effects of
isolation on brain, body, and behavior, then the very contact with the prisoner is
changing the condition (isolation) whose effect one is trying to measure. This
phenomenon of modified behavior due to being the subject of a study is commonly
known as the “Hawthorne Effect.” Researchers in one prisoner isolation study renamed
it the “Alysha Effect” after the attractive young woman who interviewed the
prisoners—two of whom were dropped from the study because of sexual advances.111
Other problems can include how to make certain your population is representative
when the sample size is often necessarily small (due to access issues) and how to
provide for a control group. Some experts believe the vulnerability and lack of
freedom of prisoners makes them incapable of giving truly informed consent. Thus,
studies of prisoners are often subject to heightened scrutiny from institutional review
boards. The vulnerable position of prisoners may also make them hesitant to share
any information that might be used against them in critical decisions, such as parole
or whether solitary confinement should be prolonged.112
However, even with these challenges, the bulk of the modern research on
prisoners in solitary confinement is remarkably consistent in its findings of
deleterious psychological effects.113 This subpart presents insights drawn from
various studies.

110. John T. Cacioppo, Louise C. Hawkley, Greg J. Norman & Gary G. Berntson, Social
Isolation, 1231 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 17, 17 (2011).
111. See Susan Greene, Inmate Study Brings No Easy Answer, DENV. POST, Nov. 7, 2010,
at B01. The study itself was funded by the National Institute of Justice. See MAUREEN L.
O’KEEFE, KELLI J. KLEBE, ALYSHA STUCKER, KRISTIN STRUM & WILLIAM LEGGETT, ONE YEAR
LONGITUDINAL STUDY OF THE PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE SEGREGATION
(2010), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/232973.pdf.
112. See Philip Bulman, The Psychological Effects of Solitary Confinement, CORRECTIONS
TODAY, June/July 2012, at 58, 58.
113. There is, however, one relatively recent study out of Colorado that concluded solitary
confinement may not be harmful to prisoners. But that study has been severely criticized on
multiple grounds. For example, it was the study that had the “Alysha Effect,” see supra note
111 and accompanying text; it was made in preparation for potential litigation against the
prison system; and it relied on self-reporting—there was no independent analysis of clinical
records or examination by a professional psychiatrist and thus there was no check on prisoner
motives to not reveal information that could harm their own status. Critics questioned whether
the study used a proper measure (adaptation), objected to how the study population was
chosen, and charged that the researchers ignored vital data even after flaws were pointed out
to them. There were records available that documented incidents of emergency psychiatric
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In the United States, nearly half of prison suicides occur in solitary confinement,
even though estimates of the percentage of those in solitary confinement range
between 2–8%.114
“Strikingly consistent” psychiatric symptoms among inmates in isolation include
hyperresponsitivity to external stimuli; perceptual distortions, illusions, and
hallucinations; severe panic attacks; difficulty with thinking, concentration, and
memory; intrusive obsessional (and often violent) thoughts that prisoners resist but
cannot block out; overt paranoia; and problems with impulse control.115 One study
of prisoners in Pelican Bay’s isolation units found 91% suffering from heightened
anxiety, 86% having hyperresponsitivity to external stimuli, 84% having difficulty
with concentration and memory, 84% having confused thought processes, 71%

contact such as suicidal and self-destructive behavior and emergence of psychotic symptoms.
Critics explained that
[a]mong the group of inmates with mental illness in Ad Seg (N = 59) there were
37 such episodes during the course of the study (an average of .62 episodes per
inmate—almost two for every three inmates). Among the group of inmates with
mental illness in [the general population] (N = 33), on the other hand, there were
only three (0.9 per inmate—less than one for every 10 inmates). . . . [T]his
objective data squarely contradicts the authors’ conclusion that Ad Seg does not
produce significantly more psychiatric difficulties than does [general population]
housing. The authors simply declined to perform this straightforward statistical
analysis of data they actually reported, even after the oversight in their early
public reports was explicitly pointed out by Dr. Grassian.
Stuart Grassian & Terry Kupers, The Colorado Study Vs. the Reality of Supermax
Confinement, 13 CORRECTIONAL MENTAL HEALTH REP. 1, 10 (2011) (emphasis in original).
As critics of the Colorado study, Drs. Grassian and Kupers, explain, the statistical probability
of this difference being entirely random is approximately one in 5000, whereas statistical
significance in research generally requires only a probability of randomness of .05, or one in
twenty. Id. Dr. Grassian also suggested that the researchers refer to the self-reported
psychiatric rating during the period of the psychiatric emergency to evaluate whether they
were indeed getting trustworthy reports from the inmates, but the authors declined. Id. One
of the inmates under the study committed suicide, and researchers did examine that inmate’s
most recent self-report. They found it revealed no evidence of any psychological distress. Id.
114. See id. at 11; Editorial, Escaping Solitary, WASH. POST, Sept. 12, 2013, at A20.
According to a recent Government Accountability Office study, the federal government
houses 7% of its 217,000 inmates in segregated housing units twenty-three hours a day. U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-429, BUREAU OF PRISONS: IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED
IN BUREAU OF PRISONS’ MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF IMPACT OF SEGREGATED HOUSING
2 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654349.pdf. This is a 17% increase from
2008 to 2013, despite the fact that the total inmate population grew by only 6% during the
same period. Id. at 14.
115. Grassian, supra note 13, at 335–36; see also HANS TOCH, MOSAIC OF DESPAIR: HUMAN
BREAKDOWNS IN PRISONS 48–54 (1992) (noting broad scale “isolation panic” that included rage,
panic, loss of control, breakdowns, psychological regression, and physiological and psychic
tension leading to self-mutilation); Bruno M. Cormier & Paul J. Williams, Excessive
Deprivation of Liberty, 11 CAN. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N J. 470 (1966) (finding three consistent
patterns of behavior among isolated inmates: verbal aggression, physical destruction of
surroundings, and development of an inner fantasy world including paranoid psychosis—also
general uncontrolled rage and an increase in homicidal and suicidal impulses).
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experiencing wide mood and emotional swings, 61% having aggressive fantasies,
44% suffering visual distortions, and 41% experiencing hallucinations. More than
half (56%) of prisoners experienced at least five of these symptoms, and 34%
experienced all eight.116
Participants in another study of solitary confinement developed psychopathologies
at a rate of 28%, versus 15% in the general population.117 A study of Danish prisoners
found that prisoners who remained in solitary confinement for longer than four weeks
had a “probability of being admitted to the prison hospital for a psychiatric reason
[that] was about 20 times as high as for a person” in the general population.118
A week of voluntary solitary confinement by prisoners resulted in decreased
electroencephalogram (EEG) activity, which is indicative of increased theta activity,
which, in turn, is related to stress, tension, and anxiety.119 “Indeed, even a few days
of solitary confinement will predictably shift the [EEG] pattern toward an abnormal
pattern characteristic of stupor and delirium.”120
Prisoners in solitary confinement engage in higher rates of self-mutilation than
those in the general population.121
For some prisoners, prolonged isolation interferes with social identity causing them to
experience a profound “ontological insecurity,” or doubts about their own existence.122
While some of the acute symptoms tend to subside after release from isolation,
there are long-term effects that may persist for decades.
These not only include persistent symptoms of post traumatic stress
(such as flashbacks, chronic hypervigilance, and a pervasive sense of

116. Haney, supra note 9, at 137.
117. H. S. Andersen, D. Sestoft, T. Lillebæk, G. Gabrielsen, R. Hemmingsen & P. Kramp,
A Longitudinal Study of Prisoners on Remand: Psychiatric Prevalence, Incidence and
Psychopathology in Solitary Vs. Non-Solitary Confinement, 102 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA
SCANDINAVICA 19, 19 (2000).
118. Haney, supra note 9, at 144 (quoting Dorte Maria Sestoft, Henrik Steen Andersen,
Tommy Lillebæk & Gorm Gabrielsen, Impact of Solitary Confinement on Hospitalization
Among Danish Prisoners in Custody, 21 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 99, 103 (1998)).
119. Paul Gendreau, N. L. Freedman, G. J. S. Wilde & G. D. Scott, Changes in EEG Alpha
Frequency and Evoked Response Latency During Solitary Confinement, 79 J. ABNORMAL
PSYCHOL. 54, 57–58 (1972).
120. Grassian, supra note 13, at 331.
121. Haney & Lynch, supra note 66, at 525.
122. As one scholar testified before a Senate hearing in 2012:
The emptiness and idleness that pervade most solitary confinement units are
profound and enveloping. The prison typically provides the prisoners in these
units with literally nothing meaningful to do. That emptiness, when combined
with the total lack of meaningful social contact, has led some prisoners into a
profound level of what might be called “ontological insecurity”—they are not
sure that they exist and, if they do, exactly who they are. A number of prisoners
have told me over the years that they actually have precipitated confrontations
with prison staff members (that sometimes result in brutal “cell extractions”) in
order to reaffirm their existence.
Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 77 (emphases added) (written statement of
Craig Haney, Professor of Psychology, University of California, Santa Cruz).
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hopelessness), but also lasting personality changes—especially
including a continuing pattern of intolerance of social interaction,
leaving the individual socially impoverished and withdrawn, subtly
angry and fearful when forced into social interaction.123
B. Brain and Behavior Studies Outside the Modern Prison
Isolation and sensory deprivation are serious issues for several groups outside the
modern domestic-prison context—including pilots, astronauts, Arctic and Antarctic
explorers, prisoners of war, and shipwrecked sailors. These groups have reported
“deterioration in the ability to think and reason, perceptual distortions, gross
disturbances in feeling states, and vivid imagery in the form of hallucinations and
delusions.”124 Studies of other social animals placed in isolation or
sensory-deprivation environments also support the thesis that these conditions
themselves are a cause of severe psychological and physical harm. Examples are
explored in more detail below.
1. Extreme Exploration
A recent report for NASA on sensory deprivation concluded that “[t]he prolonged
stress consequences of [sensory deprivation] lead to detrimental neurological changes
in the human brain, which can manifest in maladaptive behavior disorders.”125 And
“increased duration increases the intensity and likelihood” of such behaviors.126
The report explains that substituting an unchanging monotonous environment
(such as a spacecraft or a prison cell) for Earth’s natural environment deprives the
sensory organs of normal levels of stimulation. The brain interprets the sensory
deprivation as stress, and one of the body’s responses is to elevate cortisol levels. If
sensory deprivation is prolonged, chronic stress may occur.127 “Under chronic stress,
spatial and verbal memory and cognitive processes suffer. Excessive levels of
cortisol interfere with memory formation and retrieval . . . . Behavioral effects
include an increase in anxiety, paranoia, withdrawal and territorial behavior.”128
Sensory deprivation also “reduces brain activity and weakens neuromodulatory
control. This results in negative brain plasticity processes, which create a selfreinforcing downward spiral of degraded brain function.”129
Prolonged stress exposure of this type may place a person “at a significant risk
for future psychiatric deterioration, possibly including the development of
irreversible psychiatric symptoms.”130 The NASA report cites examples of prisoners
of war who, even forty years after release, may continue to suffer “symptoms of
anxiety, confusion, depression, suspiciousness and detachment from social

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Grassian, supra note 13, at 353.
NASA REPORT, supra note 104, at 8.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 11.
See id. at 35.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 41.
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interactions.”131 People who have been in prolonged isolation and confined
environments often suffer from symptoms that resemble posttraumatic stress
disorder—including “anxiety, nervousness, frequent nightmares, depression,
difficulty sleeping, inability to work, and difficulty trusting people, as well as
difficulties adapting to the world outside of confinement.”132
A study of British Royal Air Force pilots who had experienced restricted auditory
and visual stimulation in flight found that all had become significantly anxious,
“many suffered full-blown panic attacks,” and some described “feelings of
detachment from reality, and perceptual distortions.”133 A similar study of U.S. Navy
pilots found that “over one third experienced frightening feelings of unreality and
became severely anxious” when flying alone at high altitude where there is a lack of
visual and sensory stimulation.134
A study of astronauts revealed that “[m]onotonous surroundings were found to
lead to boredom, fatigue and reduction in job interest, physical anesthetization, as
well as the emergence of psychic disorders and altered behavior.”135 In response to
such concerns, the former Soviet Union was among those that placed astronauts in
“psychological relief rooms” for ten-minute sessions where they were surrounded by
natural sounds and music, film, and odors that mimicked the effect of being
immersed in nature and provided “relief for visual fatigue and nervous emotional
loads.”136 Ground-based studies found that use of these rooms increased work
production by 1.5 times, and errors were reduced by 25%.137
Individual reactions to isolation and sensory deprivation can vary widely. A recent
experiment conducted by the Russian Academy of Science in conjunction with the
European and Chinese space agencies placed a six-man crew in a simulated space ship
for 520 days. Even with participants who were heavily screened for strong physical
and mental strength and stamina, there were significant issues. One of the scientists
involved explained that “[o]ur major finding was that there were really large individual
differences with how the crew responded to the [small group] isolation . . . . Four of
them showed at least one issue that could have exploded or led to a severe adverse
effect during a Mars mission.”138 Reactions included trouble sleeping, lethargy,
problems with mental tasks, mood swings, and depression.

131. Id. at 43.
132. Id. at 42.
133. Grassian, supra note 13, app. A at 356.
134. Id. at 357.
135. NASA REPORT, supra note 104, at 23.
136. Id. at 24.
137. Id.
138. Adam Mann, Future Mars Astronauts May Be Sleepy, Bored, and Crabby, WIRED
(Jan. 7, 2013, 3:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/01/sleep-problems-mars-500/ (quoting
University of Pennsylvania School of Medicine psychiatrist Mathias Basner); see also Mathias
Basner, David F. Dinges, Daniel Mollicone, Adrian Ecker, Christopher W. Jones, Eric C.
Hyder, Adrian Di Antonio, Igor Savelev, Kevin Kan, Namni Goel, Boris V. Morukov
& Jeffrey P. Sutton, Mars 520-d Mission Simulation Reveals Protracted Crew Hypokinesis
and Alterations of Sleep Duration and Timing, 110 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 2635 (2013),
available at http://www.pnas.org/content/110/7/2635.full.pdf.
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For explorers and workers in the Arctic and Antarctic, the extremely harsh
conditions can cause small groups to be isolated and confined over long periods.
Winters last up to nine months, with temperatures so cold that venturing outside is
dangerous. Because of the prevalence of psychological disturbances during these
months, rigorous psychological screening is given beforehand. But significant levels
of psychiatric disturbances continue despite these preventive efforts. Common issues
include interpersonal tension and hostility, progressively worsening depression, sleep
disturbance, impaired cognitive functioning, and paranoia.139
Thus, isolation and sensory deprivation can have serious consequences in a variety
of settings, and detrimental psychiatric consequences may persist even when small
groups are confined together. It is also very difficult to determine in advance who will
fare best under such conditions—even those that seem strongest (screened astronauts
and Arctic explorers, for instance) may suffer severe psychiatric deterioration.
2. Effects of Isolation on Other Social Animals
“Animal studies of social isolation are an important complement to human studies
because randomization and experimental manipulations of isolation in humans is
limited in intensity and duration due to the risk of deleterious effects.”140 Many
studies of other social animals confirm the negative harmful effects of social isolation
across species.
Some of the most dramatic studies on the isolation of animals have been
conducted with rhesus monkeys. Monkeys raised in isolation were “profoundly
disturbed, given to staring blankly and rocking in place for long periods, circling
their cages repetitively, and mutilating themselves.”141 If released into a group, they
seemed to enter a state of emotional shock and would engage in self-clutching and
rocking. One refused to eat and died within five days. Some of those that had been
isolated for shorter periods were eventually able to adjust, but “[t]welve months of
isolation almost obliterated the animals socially.”142 Such animals were permanently
withdrawn and often abused by the larger group.143 More recent studies on other
animal groups have confirmed that the workings of the brain seem to be particularly
vulnerable to permanent alteration if animals are socially isolated in early life.144
This insight extends to humans. Juveniles are currently often placed in isolation
in adult jails for their own protection. But the destructive nature of isolation on a
young brain is evidenced in the suicide rates. In juvenile facilities, over 50% of
suicides occur in solitary confinement. In adult jails, the statistics are much higher.
“Suicides of youth in isolation occur nineteen times more often than in the general

139. Grassian, supra note 13, at 358–60. These symptoms have been named the
“winter-over syndrome.” Id. at 359.
140. Cacioppo et al., supra note 110, at 18.
141. Gawande, supra note 87, at 36.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See, e.g., J. L. Lukkes, C. H. Summers, J. L. Scholl, K. J. Renner & G. L. Forster,
Early Life Social Isolation Alters Corticotropin-Releasing Factor Responses in Adult Rats,
158 NEUROSCIENCE 845, 845 (2009).
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population; youth suicide rates are thirty-six times higher in adult jails than in
juvenile detention facilities.”145
Other studies have shown multiple physically and psychologically damaging
effects from isolation of animals more generally. For example, chronic social
isolation of Wistar rats caused anxiety-like and depression-like behavior that
paralleled molecular changes in the limbic brain.146 Social isolation (1) decreased the
lifespan of fruit flies because of oxidative stress, (2) decreased survival after
experimentally induced strokes in mice, (3) increased obesity and type-two diabetes
in mice, (4) increased the growth of cancerous tumors in rats, (5) increased
stress-hormone levels and oxidative stress in rabbits, and (6) caused an elevated
morning rise in cortisol in squirrel monkeys.147
Commenting on the relationship between such animal studies and the human
experience, John Cacioppo, the director of the University of Chicago’s Center for
Cognitive and Social Neuroscience, explained:
The effects of isolation in humans have much in common with the effects
of isolation found in nonhuman social species. Researchers found
increased activation of the brain’s stress systems, vascular resistance, and
blood pressure, as well as decreased inflammatory control, immunity,
sleep salubrity, and expression of genes regulating glucocorticoid
responses and oxidative stress. In sum, the health, life, and genetic legacy
of members of most social species are threatened when they find
themselves on the social perimeter.148
One of Cacioppo’s most influential insights is that these types of effects are more
strongly linked to perceived isolation than actual isolation. One of his explanations for
the great diversity we see in people’s responses to isolation is that different people have
different levels of tolerance for social disconnection—some feel the pain of such
disconnection more intensely than others. He argues that people such as Arctic explorers
are self-selected to be those who have higher thresholds for social disconnection.149
Cacioppo also claims one’s susceptibility to loneliness is approximately 50%
hereditable. He bases the hereditable theory partially on an experiment that was
conducted with rat pups—selectively bred for twenty-five generations dependent on
the strength of their maternal cry. The descendants of those with the strongest cry
(who seemed to feel the pain of deprivation from their mothers most greatly) had
greater cortisol, more depressive behavior, more withdrawal, and more anxiety than

145. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 128 (written statement of the
American Civil Liberties Union).
146. J. Djordjevic, A. Djordjevic, M. Adzic & M. B. Radojcic Effects of Chronic Isolation
on Wistar Rat Behavior and Brain Plasticity Markers, 66 NEUROPSYCHOBIOLOGY 112 (2012).
147. John T. Cacioppo & Stephanie Ortigue, Social Neuroscience: How a
Multidisciplinary Field Is Uncovering the Biology of Human Interactions, CEREBRUM, Dec.
2011, at 1, 7.
148. Id. at 7–8 (footnote omitted).
149. John T. Cacioppo, Nat’l Inst. of Health, The Matilda White Riley Lecture: Social Isolation
and Health, YOUTUBE (June 2, 2012), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xULDuo7wv3k.
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the descendants of the softer-crying pups. All these attributes and behaviors are
mimicked in people who have high levels of perceived isolation.150
Thus the evidence regarding reactions to isolation and sensory deprivation among
the general populace, prisoners, extreme explorers, and animals all points in one
direction: it is clear these deprivations can cause severe harms. The lesson of the
emerging field of social neuroscience is that the behavioral deteriorations witnessed
are linked to physical alterations occurring in the brain and body that are in turn
caused by the social and sensory deprivations. These physical alterations have
implications beyond the immediately visible behaviors—and can lead to a wide
variety of types of physical and mental disability and disease.
It is difficult (if not presently impossible) to determine precisely which harms will
befall which people with what level of severity and how soon. Severely debilitating
harms befall significant portions of the population even among those that have been
heavily screened for resilience. While not every person may feel the pain of social
disconnection and sensory deprivation to the same degree, all are at risk of serious
health consequences when so deprived. As explained previously, recent discoveries
have clarified that human brains are uniquely designed for social interaction. The
many examples of deterioration examined above illustrate that social interaction and
sensory stimulation are human necessities for health and well-being.
With this understanding of the threatened harms, the Article turns to how to
analyze such risks of harm under an Eighth Amendment framework.
III. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT IN THE CONTEXT OF PRISON CONDITIONS
Public apathy and the political powerlessness of inmates have contributed to the
pervasive neglect of the prisons. . . . Under these circumstances, the courts have emerged as
a critical force behind efforts to ameliorate inhumane conditions.
– Justice Brennan 151

A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
Although the Supreme Court has never considered a case in which a party argued
that solitary confinement as generally practiced in the United States is per se cruel
and unusual, the Court has acknowledged that “[c]onfinement in . . . an isolation cell
is a form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”152
This baseline assumption was not always clear. Until 1976, the Court had not
considered whether the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on “cruel and unusual
punishments” was applicable to prison conditions. Some had argued, as Justice Thomas
does today, that “judges or juries—but not jailers—impose ‘punishment.’”153 But
others argued that at least some (if not all) conditions of imprisonment could represent
“punishment” within the meaning of the Amendment.

150. Id.
151. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 358–59 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment).
152. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
153. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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Estelle v. Gamble154 was the first case in which the Supreme Court applied the
Punishments Clause to a condition of confinement. (Some do not characterize Estelle
as a prison-condition case—but I use the term broadly, as has the Supreme Court.)155
Estelle held that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.”156
That case explained the history of the Punishments Clause in broad strokes (and,
as will be discussed in the next Part of this Article, in strokes not all scholars would
agree are correct). According to Estelle, the drafters’ primary concern was “to
proscribe tortures and other barbarous methods of punishment.”157 And the first
Supreme Court cases addressing this constitutional provision confined themselves to
such concerns. But in later cases, the Punishments Clause was interpreted to have a
broader scope. While Estelle recognized that in worst-case scenarios failure to
provide medical treatment might result in “‘torture or a lingering death,’ the evils of
most immediate concern to the drafters of the Amendment,”158 it was under this
broader interpretation of the Punishments Clause that the Court found a government
obligation to provide medical care for those it incarcerated.159
Landmark cases that had provided a broadened definition of Eighth Amendment
protection include Weems v. United States160—an early twentieth-century case that
rejected the idea that “cruel and unusual punishments” could refer only to
punishments on par with disembowelment, burning alive, physical torture, or
methods causing a lingering death.161 Instead, Weems examined the Punishments
Clause in the context of the rest of the Amendment, which prohibits excessive bail
or fines, and found that the Amendment proscribes “all punishments which by their
excessive length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offenses charged. . . .
The whole inhibition is against that which is excessive in the bail required or fine
imposed, or punishment inflicted.”162 Thus, the Court overturned a sentence that
included fifteen years of “hard and painful labor” in chains at the ankle and wrist
night and day for the offense of falsifying a public document.163 The case also

154. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
155. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 303 (1991) (“Whether one characterizes the
treatment received by [the prisoner] as inhuman conditions of confinement, failure to attend
to his medical needs, or a combination of both, it is appropriate to apply the ‘deliberate
indifference’ standard articulated in Estelle.” (alteration in original) (quoting LaFaut v. Smith,
834 F.2d 389, 391–92 (4th Cir. 1987))).
156. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104 (citation omitted) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
173 (1976)).
157. Id. at 102 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).
158. Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
159. Id.
160. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
161. Id. at 370–71.
162. Id. at 371 (quoting O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339–40 (1892) (Field, J.,
dissenting)). For a fuller discussion of this case, see also Elizabeth Bennion, Death Is Different
No Longer: Abolishing the Insanity Defense Is Cruel and Unusual Under Graham v. Florida,
61 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 4−5 (2011).
163. Weems, 217 U.S. at 358, 364.
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observed that the Punishments Clause was not static but progressive and could
“acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice.”164
In 1958, Trop v. Dulles most famously picked up this latter theme, declaring in a
plurality opinion that the Eighth Amendment “must draw its meaning from the
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”165 In a
footnote, the case seemed to dismiss the idea that the language “cruel and unusual”
should be translated in its most literal sense—though a close reading shows the Court
taking no particular stand on that issue. The Court explained:
Whether the word “unusual” has any qualitative meaning different from
“cruel” is not clear. On the few occasions this Court has had to consider
the meaning of the phrase, precise distinctions between cruelty and
unusualness do not seem to have been drawn. [Our] cases indicate that
the Court simply examines the particular punishment involved in light of
the basic prohibition against inhuman treatment, without regard to any
subtleties of meaning that might be latent in the word “unusual.”166
The footnote went on to explain that if “unusual” had any separate meaning from
“cruel” (an issue on which the Court took no position), it should simply be “the ordinary
one, signifying something different from that which is generally done.”167 And the
Court explained that denationalization, the punishment at issue in the case, would meet
such a test since it was first explicitly sanctioned by the government only in 1940 and
had never been “tested against the Constitution until this day,”168 even though “this
day” was eighteen years later—meaning it had been in use for nearly two decades.
But in the main body of the opinion, the Court did not spend space or energy in
defining “cruel and unusual” in such literal terms. Instead the Court asserted that
“[t]he basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man.”169 While the State had the “power to punish, the Amendment stands
to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”170 And
the Court found that denationalization violated those civilized standards by “the total
destruction of the individual’s status in organized society.”171 Interestingly, the
opinion also refers to the “virtual unanimity” of “civilized nations of the world” for
moral authority that statelessness should not be an available criminal punishment.172

164. Id. at 378.
165. 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
166. Id. at 100 n.32 (citation omitted).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 100.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 101.
172. Id. at 102. Thus confirming what other scholars have noted—that Justice Kennedy is
far from the first Supreme Court Justice to use international sources. “It takes no more than a
glance at the earliest volumes of U.S. Reports to confirm that the practice of drawing upon
international sources is nothing new to the Supreme Court. Beginning with its earliest opinions
in the 1790s, the Court has often referred to international law and non-American materials.”
Stephen C. McCaffrey, There’s a Whole World Out There: Justice Kennedy’s Use of
International Sources, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 201, 201 (2013).
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Such international comparisons and the position that what is “cruel and unusual”
should be defined by contemporary evolving standards could be interpreted as an effort
to determine what is and is not sufficiently “unusual” under the Amendment, but the
Trop footnote discussed above suggests that is not how the Court envisioned it. Instead,
the international comparisons and efforts to determine contemporary standards seem
to simply provide further authority for making the normative moral judgment of what
should be considered excessively cruel or inhumane.173
Another case upon which Estelle drew extensively was one that had been decided
earlier that same year, Gregg v. Georgia.174 As recognized in Estelle, Gregg
explained that under the oft-quoted Trop decision, punishments indeed needed to
comport with public perceptions of standards of decency.175 But beyond that,
punishments must accord with “the dignity of man,” which meant “at least” that
excessive punishments were prohibited.176 Excessive punishments in the abstract (as
opposed to challenges of specific punishments for a specific defendant for specific
crimes) were defined as ones that either involved the “unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain” or were “grossly out of proportion to the severity of the crime.”177
Expounding on “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” the Court explained that
a “sanction imposed cannot be so totally without penological justification that it
results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.”178
In Estelle, withholding medications for a serious injury was found to be just such
an unnecessary infliction of pain without penal justification. By finding that the
Eighth Amendment “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized
standards, humanity, and decency,’” the Court established the government’s
obligation to care for prisoners who could not care for themselves due to their
incarceration.179 The Court stated that
[t]he infliction of such unnecessary suffering is inconsistent with
contemporary standards of decency as manifested in modern legislation
codifying the common-law view that “it is but just that the public be
required to care for the prisoner, who cannot by reason of the deprivation
of his liberty, care for himself.”180

173. See Sharon Dolovich, Cruelty, Prison Conditions, and the Eighth Amendment, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 881, 883 n.3 (2009) (“But the concern with ‘evolving standards of decency’
that motivates the dueling census-taking of state practices found in the Court’s recent death
penalty decisions stems from the Clause’s prohibition on cruelty, and reflects a rejection of
the originalist position that Eighth Amendment cruelty should be interpreted to mean what it
meant when the Bill of Rights was adopted.” (emphasis in original)).
174. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
175. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182–83).
176. Id. at 173 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
177. Id. at 173.
178. Id. at 173, 183; see also Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 346 (1981).
179. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968)).
180. Id. at 103–04 (footnote omitted) (quoting Spicer v. Williamson, 132 S.E. 291, 293
(N.C. 1926)).
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But, in a move that has been heavily criticized by some scholars,181 the Court did
not go so far as to say that any failure or even any negligent failure to provide
adequate medical care for serious illness or injury would qualify as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment. The key words were “deliberate indifference.” Negligence
might result in the unnecessary infliction of pain—but only when there was
deliberate indifference would it also be “wanton” or sufficiently “repugnant to the
conscience of mankind” to “offend ‘evolving standards of decency’ in violation of
the Eighth Amendment.”182
Several cases following Estelle indicated that the Supreme Court would be willing
to consider prison conditions generally (beyond issues of medical attention) under
the Eighth Amendment. For example, Ingraham v. Wright stated in dicta that
“[p]rison brutality . . . is ‘part of the total punishment to which the individual is being
subjected for his crime and, as such, is a proper subject for Eighth Amendment
scrutiny.’”183 Hutto v. Finney was the first case to actually require an analysis of the
Eighth Amendment’s relation to prison conditions beyond medical care. The parties
did not dispute that the Punishments Clause applied to prison conditions generally—
and the Court observed that “[c]onfinement in a prison or in an isolation cell is a
form of punishment subject to scrutiny under Eighth Amendment standards.”184
Prison officials challenged only two aspects of relief granted by the district court. In
upholding the district court’s remedy regarding limitations on solitary confinement,
the Supreme Court considered only objective conditions of confinement and stated
there was “no error in the [district court’s] conclusion that, taken as a whole,
conditions in the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment.”185
Rhodes v. Chapman was the first case in which the disputed issue before the Court
was the limitations that the Eighth Amendment imposes on conditions of
confinement in prison beyond medical care. Unsurprisingly, given the language in
cases like Estelle, Ingraham, and Hutto, the Court held unequivocally that the
Punishments Clause did apply to prison conditions generally.186 Although Rhodes
repeated much of Estelle’s language, it refused to recognize any “static ‘test’” that
could determine an Eighth Amendment violation, since a court would have to
evaluate “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society.”187 Most significantly, it did not employ any analysis of whether the
challenged conditions were the result of “deliberate indifference.” Instead, it made
an objective analysis of whether the prison conditions resulted in deprivation of “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,” including food, medical care,
sanitation, and whether violence was increased or other conditions were created that
would be “intolerable for prison confinement.”188 The Constitution, Rhodes declared,

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 173.
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105–06.
430 U.S. 651, 669 (1977) (quoting Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909, 915 (5th Cir. 1976)).
437 U.S. 678, 685 (1978).
Id. at 687.
Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 345 (1981).
Id. at 346 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
Id. at 347–48.
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“does not mandate comfortable prisons.”189 But the Court also provided for the
possibility of a cumulative effect of substandard conditions—explaining that prison
conditions “alone or in combination” might unconstitutionally deprive a prisoner of
minimum necessities.190
Thus, following Rhodes and Estelle, the Court had provided two separate modes
of analysis—one involving merely an objective inquiry into whether a deprivation
was sufficiently serious, and the other requiring the additional element of a culpable
state of mind. Rhodes’s seeming rejection of the idea that deliberate indifference was
always necessary in an Eighth Amendment prison-conditions case was reiterated in
a concurrence that emphasized: “The touchstone of the Eighth Amendment inquiry
is the effect upon the imprisoned.”191
Recognizing the tension between such divergent modes of analysis, Wilson v.
Seiter sought to harmonize Estelle and Rhodes. Reasoning that “punishment” must
inherently be a deliberate act, as opposed to, for example, accidentally stepping on a
prisoner’s toe, Wilson held that prison conditions could not violate the Eighth
Amendment without a showing of deliberate indifference and a showing that the
deprivation was objectively serious enough to constitute a minimal life necessity.192
Wilson characterized Rhodes as a case in which it had simply not been necessary to
reach the subjective component of the test for a Punishments Clause violation,
because the objective prong had not been met.193
A concurrence of four Justices took issue with this characterization, arguing that
a subjective test would often be unworkable in the context of conditions created by
“cumulative actions and inactions by numerous officials inside and outside a prison,
sometimes over a long period of time. . . . In truth, intent simply is not very
meaningful when considering a challenge to an institution . . . .”194 Further, the
concurrence argued that the approach was unwise, as it left open the possibility for
prison officials to defeat challenges of clearly inhumane conditions by showing there
was some other cause than deliberate indifference—insufficient funding, for
instance. “The ultimate result of today’s decision, [the concurring Justices feared], is
that serious deprivations of basic human needs will go unredressed due to an
unnecessary and meaningless search for deliberate indifference.”195
Cases that followed further defined the boundaries of the subjective and objective
tests. Helling v. McKinney provided that a risk of serious injury could be enough to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment.196 “[A] remedy for unsafe conditions need

189. Id. at 349.
190. Id. at 347.
191. Id. at 366 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment) (internal quotation marks omitted).
192. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 299−304 (1991).
193. Id. at 298.
194. Id. at 310 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
195. Id. at 311 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
196. See 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993) (considering whether risk of injury from second-hand
smoke could constitute cruel and unusual punishment).
[W]hether McKinney’s conditions of confinement violate the Eighth
Amendment requires more than a scientific and statistical inquiry into the
seriousness of the potential harm and the likelihood that such injury to health will
actually be caused by exposure to [environmental tobacco smoke]. It also
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not await a tragic event.”197 The fact that the risked injury may never occur or is not
imminent is dispositive for neither the objective nor the subjective prongs.198
Farmer v. Brennan undertook a lengthy analysis of the meaning of “deliberate
indifference.”199 It concluded that it was “more than mere negligence” and “less than
acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result.”200 The Court landed on a standard comparable to what is required in
criminal rather than civil contexts for recklessness: the prison official must recklessly
disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety of which he or she was aware,
not simply one of which the official should have been aware.201
Although the standard requires actual awareness, that awareness may be inferred
from circumstantial evidence—such as that the risk was obvious.202 “Nor may a
prison official escape liability for deliberate indifference by showing that, while he
was aware of an obvious, substantial risk to inmate safety, he did not know that the
complainant was especially likely to be assaulted by the specific prisoner who
eventually committed the assault.”203 Awareness of the general risk would be enough
to allay the Court’s concerns that the action, or inaction, constituted punishment.204
The most recent case to address prison conditions and the Eighth Amendment is
Brown v. Plata. The Supreme Court affirmed a three-judge court ruling requiring
California to dramatically reduce overcrowding in its prisons to 137.5% of design
capacity.205 The Court agreed that “[t]he medical and mental health care provided by
California’s prisons falls below the standard of decency that inheres in the Eighth
Amendment. This extensive and ongoing constitutional violation requires a remedy,
and a remedy will not be achieved without a reduction in overcrowding.”206 It reiterated
the core of the Eighth Amendment as the “dignity of man”207 and refused to call the
remedy overbroad, because any prisoners in the system who became sick or mentally
ill would become the “system’s next potential victims.”208
Thus, through twists and turns, the modern Supreme Court jurisprudence
regarding prison conditions that violate the Eighth Amendment requires both an

requires a court to assess whether society considers the risk that the prisoner
complains of to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to
expose anyone unwillingly to such a risk. In other words, the prisoner must show
that the risk of which he complains is not one that today’s society chooses to
tolerate.
Id. (emphasis in original).
197. Id. at 33.
198. See id.
199. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
200. Id. at 835.
201. See id. at 836−38.
202. Id. at 842.
203. Id. at 843.
204. Cf. id. at 838 (“But an official’s failure to alleviate a significant risk that he should
have perceived but did not, while no cause for commendation, cannot under our cases be
condemned as the infliction of punishment.”).
205. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1923 (2011).
206. Id. at 1947.
207. Id. at 1928 (internal quotation marks omitted).
208. Id. at 1940.
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objective showing of at least a substantial risk of serious harm and a subjective
showing of recklessness on the part of the government. The objective showing must
be sensitive to the evolving mores of society. And the subjective component must
show actual awareness on the part of the government before the condition or risk will
qualify as “punishment” at all.
B. Criticisms of Supreme Court Analysis
The current two-part test for determining whether prison conditions violate the
Eighth Amendment has received limited scholarly attention when compared to other
aspects of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, such as sentencing.209 But that is not
because the test is so well constructed that it is immune from criticism. Indeed, there
are multiple problems with the current framework.
The Supreme Court’s decision to include a “deliberate indifference” requirement in
the Eighth Amendment analysis is fundamentally flawed. First, it places undue
emphasis on the subjective intent of prison authorities, instead of focusing on the effect
of conditions upon the imprisoned.210 The text of the Amendment restricts punishments
based on the nature of those punishments, not the nature of the inflictors.
Second, the deliberate-indifference standard creates perverse incentives for
authorities to turn a blind eye to severe human suffering. So long as they do not notice
an inhumane condition, they will not be held responsible for failing to change it—
even if they reasonably should have noticed it, and “despite the fact that when prison
officials do not pay attention, prisoners may be exposed to the worst forms of
suffering and abuse.”211
Third, by requiring deliberate indifference to classify a prison condition as a
“punishment,” the standard may cause “courts [to] be too deferential because of the
difficulty in policing the line between prison conditions that reflect management

209. See Glidden, supra note 19, at 1816.
210. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 366 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in the
judgment); see also Jeffrey M. Lipman, Eighth Amendment and Deliberate Indifference
Standard for Prisoners: Eighth Circuit Outlook, 31 CREIGHTON L. REV. 435 (1998); Katherine
L. Smith, Comment, Lost Souls: Constitutional Implications for the Deficiencies in Treatment
for Persons with Mental Illness in Custody, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 497 (2012); Richard
D. Vetstein, Note, Rape and AIDS in Prison: On a Collision Course to a New Death Penalty,
30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 863 (1997).
211. Dolovich, supra note 173, at 892; see also Mary McLean Jordan, Comment, Care To
Prevent HIV Infection in Prison: A Moral Right Recognized by Canada, While the United
States Lags Behind, 37 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 319 (2006); Heather M. Kinney, Note,
The “Deliberate Indifference” Test Defined: Mere Lip Service to the Protection of Prisoners’
Civil Rights, 5 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 121 (1995); Matt Lloyd, Note, Dormant Data:
Why and How To Make Good Use of Deaths in Custody Reporting, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301
(2012); Jeffrey Smith McLeod, Note, Anxiety, Despair, and the Maddening Isolation of
Solitary Confinement: Invoking the First Amendment’s Protection Against State Action That
Invades the Sphere of the Intellect and Spirit, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 647 (2009); Christine Peek,
Comment, Breaking out of the Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and the
Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1211, 1244 (2004); Christine Rebman,
Comment, The Eighth Amendment and Solitary Confinement: The Gap in Protection from
Psychological Consequences, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 567 (1999).
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principles and prison conditions that are punitive in nature.”212 The subjective prong
can be too easily defeated by showing concerns over cost or other motivations aside
from deliberate indifference, even if prison conditions are extremely inhumane.213
Fourth, difficulties in employing the present standard include the problem of how
to determine institutional intent or an institutional state of mind where there are
multiple actors with multiple mental states.214 This difficulty will often result in the
factor simply being a proxy for the fact finder’s biases about the institution.215
There are also problems with the objective component of the Supreme Court test
regarding the sufficient severity of the condition at issue—usually meaning whether
there was a deprivation of a minimal life necessity or an imposition of unnecessary
suffering so severe that it offends contemporary societal values.
First—and this criticism applies to Punishments Clause jurisprudence generally,
not just the prison-conditions test—the dependence on contemporary evolving
societal values raises numerous difficulties.216 For example, whose values count in

212. Alexander A. Reinert, Eighth Amendment Gaps: Can Conditions of Confinement
Litigation Benefit from Proportionality Theory?, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 53, 75−76 (2009).
213. See Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 311 (1991) (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
214. See Glidden, supra note 19, at 1836; Will A. Smith, Comment, Civil Liability for
Sexual Assault in Prison: A Challenge to the “Deliberate Indifference” Standard, 34 CUMB.
L. REV. 289 (2004).
215. Glidden supra note 19, at 1837; see also Lisa DiBartolomeo, Case Comment,
Constitutional Law—Subjective Awareness Governs the Deliberate Indifference Standard in
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Claims—Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994), 29
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 294 (1995); Richard Siever, Note, HMOs Behind Bars: Constitutional
Implications of Managed Health Care in the Prison System, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1365 (2005).
216. See, e.g., Jennifer Carter, Capital Punishment: A Struggle To Satisfy Evolving
Standards of Decency—Reviewing the Debate in the United States and Canada, 17 SW. J.
INT’L L. 237, 254 (2011); Samuel J.M. Donnelly, Capital Punishment: A Critique of the
Political and Philosophical Thought Supporting the Justices’ Positions, 24 ST. MARY’S L.J.
1, 33–34 (1992); James B. Johnston, Executing Capital Punishment via Case Study: A Socratic
Chat About New Jersey’s Abolition of the Death Penalty and Convincing Other States To
Follow Suit, 34 J. LEGIS. 1, 6 (2008); Mary Kate Kearney, Substantive Due Process and
Parental Corporal Punishment: Democracy and the Excluded Child, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
1, 4 (1995); Corinna Barrett Lain, Lessons Learned from the Evolution of “Evolving
Standards,” 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 661, 663–64 (2010); Susan M. Raeker-Jordan, Parsing
Personal Predilections: A Fresh Look at the Supreme Court’s Cruel and Unusual Death
Penalty Jurisprudence, 58 ME. L. REV. 100, 104–06 (2006); Douglas L. Simon, Making Sense
of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: A New Approach to Reconciling Military and Civilian
Eighth Amendment Law, 184 MIL. L. REV. 66, 69 (2005); John F. Stinneford, The Original
Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L.
REV. 1739, 1751–53 (2008); Courtney Butler, Comment, Baze v. Rees: Lethal Injection as a
Constitutional Method of Execution, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 509, 520–22 (2009); Michael D.
Dean, Comment, State Legislation and the “Evolving Standards of Decency”: Flaws in the
Constitutional Review of Death Penalty Statutes, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 379, 381–82 (2010);
Etta J. Mullin, Case Note, At What Age Should They Die? The United States Supreme Court
Decision with Respect to Juvenile Offenders and the Death Penalty: Stanford v. Kentucky and
Wilkins v. Missouri, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1990), 16 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 161, 183 (1990);
Michael J. O’Connor, Note, What Would Darwin Say?: The Mis-Evolution of the Eighth
Amendment, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1389, 1414 (2003); Bethany Siena, Note, Kennedy v.
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that analysis, and how do you measure them? Are international sources relevant?
Which domestic sources are relevant? What are the time constraints on the analysis—
do we look at what has been accepted over the last ten, twenty, fifty years or more,
or are we only concerned with current whims? Where there seem to be differences
in societal viewpoints on a matter, what should tip the balance? Does it make sense
for the cruel and unusual status of a punishment to turn on how long it takes certain
elements of our own or others’ societies to recognize the inhumanity in our legislative
systems (a measure often used by the Supreme Court)?
On issues particular to a prison-conditions analysis, there are further ambiguities.
What should qualify as basic life necessities? What about exercise, sunlight, or a
prisoner who cannot sleep because lights are on all night? How cold must it be before
lack of heating or adequate blankets become cruel and unusual? Should
psychological as well as physical harm be considered? Should it matter why any
particular deprivation occurred?217
These types of ambiguities contribute to the fear that the “objective prong” of the
test will again simply be a proxy for preexisting subjective views of what should or
should not be an acceptable condition of imprisonment. Inconsistent lower court
judgments on this prong serve to bolster the theory that “[l]ower court decisions on
what constitutes ‘sufficiently serious’ have been largely dictated by the sentiments
of the judge and the quality of the advocacy.”218
Many scholars also see Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as having departed too
far afield from the requirements of the text. They advocate either a return to an
analysis of what is cruel219 or an analysis of both what is cruel and what is unusual.220
However, their interpretations of what those terms should mean in any context, not
just that of prison conditions, are far from uniform.221 Nor do scholars agree on the
relation of those two words—that is, whether “unusual” should be considered
separately at all, and if so, whether it has an entirely independent meaning or equal
force in a proper interpretation.222

Louisiana Reaffirms the Necessity of Revising the Eighth Amendment’s Evolving Standards of
Decency Analysis, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 259, 270 (2009).
217. See Glidden, supra note 19, at 1828.
218. Id. at 1823.
219. See, e.g., Dolovich, supra note 173, at 886–89.
220. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW,
COURTS 124 (2007); Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit
Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567 (2010)
[hereinafter Ryan, Both Cruel and Unusual]; Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 81 (2010); Joshua L. Shapiro, And Unusual: Examining the Forgotten Prong of the
Eighth Amendment, 38 U. MEM. L. REV. 465, 487 (2008); Stinneford, supra note 216.
221. For example, Michael Perry would interpret “unusual” to mean “not commonly used”
presently on a global scale, see Michael J. Perry, Is Capital Punishment Unconstitutional?
And Even If We Think It Is, Should We Want the Supreme Court To So Rule?, 41 GA. L. REV.
867, 881 (2007); conversely, John Stinneford would define “unusual” as “contrary to long
usage,” see Stinneford, supra note 216, at 1767.
222. See, e.g., HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 37 (1977); Ryan, Both Cruel and Unusual, supra note 220; Shapiro, supra note
220, at 470.
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The one idea for which there is general consensus is that we should not simply look
at which specific punishments were considered cruel and unusual at the time of the
founding.223 Thus, even an ardent originalist like Justice Scalia has said that “in a crunch
I may prove a faint-hearted originalist. I cannot imagine myself, any more than any other
federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the punishment of flogging.” 224
C. An Improved Prison-Conditions Eighth Amendment Standard
Because of the multiple problems with the current standard explained above, an
analysis of prison conditions under the Eighth Amendment should not require a
finding of deliberate indifference. Such intent is not logically required for an
inhumane prison condition to qualify as a “punishment.” There was intent in
imprisoning the inmate—thereby taking on the “carceral burden” of providing for
that person’s health and safety. Thus all state-created conditions of confinement
could be interpreted as punishments regardless of whether any particular official
manifested deliberate indifference regarding particular prison conditions.225 To try to
disconnect the meaning of punishment from the means by which a sentence is carried
out would far too easily circumvent constitutional protections.226

223. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989) (“At a minimum, the Eighth Amendment
prohibits punishment considered cruel and unusual at the time the Bill of Rights was adopted.
The prohibitions of the Eighth Amendment are not limited, however, to those practices
condemned by the common law in 1789.” (citation omitted)), abrogated on other grounds by
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
224. Antonin Scalia, Address, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864
(1989). Though whether Justice Scalia would find a flogging that occurred in a prison at the
hands of a wayward guard to be cruel and unusual punishment is more debatable. Justice Scalia
apparently supports the Whitley standard for judging whether a prison official’s act in response
to a disturbance constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S.
312 (1986), abrogated by Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S. 34 (2010) (per curiam). Although such
use of force could be considered a prison condition, it has been cordoned off in a separate
category of its own. In Whitley, the Court considered whether an official applied force “in a
good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very
purpose of causing harm.” Id. at 320–21 (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d
Cir. 1973), rejected by Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). The Court in Whitley
required this malice standard for wantonness because, as Scalia explained in Wilson v. Seiter,
“Where (as in Whitley) officials act in response to a prison disturbance, their actions are
necessarily taken ‘in haste, under pressure,’ and balanced against ‘competing institutional
concerns for the safety of prison staff or other inmates.’” 501 U.S. 294, 302 (1991) (quoting
Whitley, 475 U.S. at 320).
225. See Dolovich, supra note 173, at 890–91 (2009); see also Melvin Gutterman, The Contours
of Eighth Amendment Prison Jurisprudence: Conditions of Confinement, 48 SMU L. REV. 373, 395
(1995); Thomas K. Landry, “Punishment” and the Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1607, 1638
n.176 (1996); Jason D. Sanabria, Note, Farmer v. Brennan: Do Prisoners Have Any Rights Left
Under the Eighth Amendment?, 16 WHITTIER L. REV. 1113 (1995).
226. For example, Justice Thomas would only recognize as “punishment” conditions
imposed by a judge or jury rather than a jailer. Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 40 (1993)
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Some scholars also argue that even if “deliberate indifference” is shown,
this does not necessarily mean the condition was imposed for the purpose of chastising or
deterring the prisoner—features they argue are necessary for a condition to qualify as
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While all state-created conditions of imprisonment should be thus considered part
and parcel of a “punishments” definition, this does not mean that every cruel
condition of imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment. Prison is an inherently
cruel environment in that society willfully inflicts pain and suffering. Severely
restricting liberty of a person for months or years is a cruel act. But it is not
necessarily excessively cruel, nor is it unusual to, for example, imprison someone
convicted of an intentional violent crime.
The words “cruel and unusual” should be interpreted to encompass any prison
condition that is inhumane or excessively cruel. Scholars have disagreed over the
original intent regarding whether “cruel and unusual” was to be translated literally
or whether the words were used as a term of art for excessive punishments of any
kind regardless of their frequency.227 But interpreting the Punishments Clause as a
simple popularity test leads to untenable results. Disembowelment, for example,
should not cease to violate the Eighth Amendment simply because many states or
countries suddenly revive the practice.
The Supreme Court’s insight that the Eighth Amendment seems to be directed at
preventing that which is excessive—in terms of both fines imposed and punishments
inflicted—is correct. Any punishment that denies a minimum human necessity is
excessively cruel and inhumane regardless of how frequently it may be employed.
Minimum human necessities should be defined to include (though not be limited to)
any condition that imposes an unnecessary and high risk of severe harm—regardless
of how imminent the risk and regardless of whether the harm ever materializes.

“punishment” under the Amendment. See, e.g., Sara L. Rose, “Cruel and Unusual Punishment”
Need Not Be Cruel, Unusual, or Punishment, 24 CAP. U. L. REV. 827, 829 (1995).
227. See, e.g., LARRY CHARLES BERKSON, THE CONCEPT OF CRUEL AND UNUSUAL
PUNISHMENT 3–8 (1975); John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality:
A Specific Critique of Retributivism, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 71, 89–98 (2010); Erwin Chemerinsky,
The Constitution and Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1063–65 (2004); Laurence Claus,
Methodology, Proportionality, Equality: Which Moral Question Does the Eighth Amendment
Pose?, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 45 (2008); Richard S. Frase, Excessive Prison
Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to
What?, 89 MINN. L. REV. 571, 574 (2005); Anthony F. Granucci, “Nor Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Inflicted:” The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839, 839–44 (1969); Donna
H. Lee, Resuscitating Proportionality in Noncapital Criminal Sentencing, 40 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
527, 528 (2008); Eva S. Nilsen, Decency, Dignity, and Desert: Restoring Ideals of Humane
Punishment to Constitutional Discourse, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 111, 157–68 (2007); Alice
Ristroph, Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government, 55 DUKE L.J. 263, 301–02
(2005); Carol S. Steiker, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the
Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 285, 290 (2007);
John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments
Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 899, 927, 938–52 (2011); Stinneford, supra note 216, at 1747, 1770,
1808–10 (2008); Stephanie E. Carlson, Note, State v. Pack: Proportionality of Sentences—
Should It Be a Necessary Factor in Determining Whether a Sentence “Shocks the Conscience of
the Court?,” 40 S.D. L. REV. 130, 141 (1995); Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s
Backwards Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1297–98 (2000);
Note, The Eighth Amendment, Proportionality, and the Changing Meaning of “Punishments,”
122 HARV. L. REV. 960, 961 (2009).
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“Cruel and unusual” should not be interpreted to mean that the punishment must
always be literally infrequent before it will violate the Punishments Clause, but
neither should the word “unusual” be utterly disregarded in its literal sense. Rather,
the word could be used to clarify the boundaries of what is excessively cruel when
the boundaries are unclear. If, for example, a defendant has succeeded in showing
that a prison condition violates a minimum human necessity, then that condition
should be considered cruel and unusual without further need of analysis. However,
if the evidence is not overwhelming that the complained-of condition is inhumane or
excessively cruel, the word “unusual” in its literal sense could provide further data
points in weighing the decision. Relevant data points in that analysis would include
both the frequency of the current use of the condition in prisons and whether the use
has been consistent over time—and if not, whether inconsistencies were due to
concerns over the condition’s inherent cruelty.
Courts could use these data points to weigh the ultimate normative question:
whether the conditions are too cruel to survive an Eighth Amendment analysis. If
either domestic or international practice has been inconsistent over time due to
concerns over the cruelty of the treatment, or if the current domestic or international
trend is away from the practice for similar reasons, those factors should weigh in
favor of finding the practice cruel and unusual. While international data is relevant,
domestic evidence should weigh more heavily in the balance to ensure that U.S. law
is in line with its own societal values. This alternative means of Eighth Amendment
analysis of prison conditions would be truer to both the text and the purpose of the
Punishments Clause than the current analytic framework.
D. Why Solitary Confinement Is “Cruel and Unusual” Despite Its
Frequent Use in the United States
While this Article argues for a different standard for measuring what is cruel and
unusual in terms of prison conditions, solitary confinement should qualify as a
violation of the Punishments Clause under either the present or a modified
interpretation of the Eighth Amendment.
1. Cruel and Unusual Under Today’s Standard
The analysis under today’s standard would focus on whether solitary-confinement
conditions meet the two-prong test of (1) sufficiently serious cruelty (2) imposed
with “deliberate indifference.”228 Although almost all lower courts have refused to
find solitary confinement cruel and unusual unless aimed at specific vulnerable
categories such as the severely mentally ill,229 solitary-confinement conditions in the
United States do satisfy both prongs of the test.
First, the evidence previously discussed concerning the serious deleterious effects
of prolonged solitary confinement on the psyche and on the body show that social
contact and sensory stimulation is a “minimal life necessity”—just like food,

228. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994).
229. See, e.g., Madrid v. Gomez, 889 F. Supp. 1146 (N.D. Cal. 1995).
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sanitation, and medical care (the examples cited in Rhodes230), and “warmth or
exercise” (examples added by Wilson231). As one expert explained: “Human beings
require some degree of social interaction and productive activity to establish and
sustain a sense of identity and to maintain a grasp on reality.”232
The efforts of some to distinguish psychological harm as somehow less serious
than physical harm in an Eighth Amendment analysis is flawed on several grounds.
First, the ongoing social-neuroscience research clarifies that the type of severe
psychological deterioration observed in solitary confinement is due to physical harms
imposed on the brain.233 Second, these physical alterations in the brain can lead to
what society would consider physical harms, such as disease and death.234 Third, the
disturbed behaviors can also lead to immediately obvious physical harm, including
self-mutilation and suicide.235 Fourth, if the purpose of cruel and unusual
punishments is to protect the prisoner from tortuous punishments, most would agree
that psychological tortures can be far worse than physical ones. Many prefer a broken
arm to a broken mind.
The fact that any particular inmate in solitary confinement may not yet be
exhibiting severe symptoms of psychological deterioration is irrelevant. Helling
clarified that a risk of serious injury can constitute cruel and unusual punishment.236
There is no need to wait for an inmate to become insane to acknowledge that solitary
confinement is cruel and unusual. The fact that serious risks may never materialize
in serious harm (or that harm may not be imminent) is not dispositive for either prong
of the test.237 Although it is clear that some populations are at greater risk of harm
than others (juveniles and the already mentally ill, for instance), no person is immune
to serious risk—as evidenced by the extremely high percentages of those affected in
prisons and the studies of psychologically screened astronauts and explorers.238
The question is “whether society considers the risk that the prisoner complains of
to be so grave that it violates contemporary standards of decency to expose anyone
unwillingly to such a risk.”239 Denial of minimal life necessities has been defined as
cruel and unusual punishment precisely because such denial meets that standard.
Civilized society will not tolerate neglecting the most basic human needs of those
who are necessarily under the state’s care due to the state’s deprivation of their

230. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347–48 (1981).
231. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991).
232. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 146 (written statement of Shenna
Bellows, Executive Director, Zachary L. Heiden, Legal Director, and Alysia Melnick, Public
Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine) (quoting An Act To Ensure
Humane Treatment for Special Management Prisoners: Hearing on L.D. 1611 Before the J.
Comm. on Criminal Justice & Pub. Safety, 124th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Me. 2010) [hereinafter
Maine Hearing] (statement of Dr. Stuart Grassian)).
233. See supra notes 105–09 and accompanying text.
234. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
236. See Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 33, 36 (1993).
237. See id. at 33.
238. See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
239. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36 (emphasis in original).
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liberty.240 The scientific evidence discussed above establishes that some degree of
social interaction and productive activity is a minimal necessity without which the
body, brain, and associated behavior may begin to seriously deteriorate.
The “deliberate indifference” prong of the test is also met. Where injunctive relief
is sought, prisoners could certainly show by the time of trial that authorities were
aware of either the actual harm or risk of harm caused by solitary confinement. The
lawsuit itself would have made them aware even if it had not already been obvious.
Helling explained that for purposes of injunctive relief, “deliberate indifference[]
should be determined in light of the prison authorities’ current attitudes and
conduct.”241 And, according to Farmer, the awareness need not be individualized—
awareness of a general serious risk involved with solitary confinement is enough.242
Thus, even under the arguably flawed current standard, solitary confinement is
cruel and unusual—regardless of how usual it may currently be within our system.
2. Cruel and Unusual Under a Modified Standard
Under the modified standard proposed, there would be no need to do the
deliberate-indifference analysis. Because the state has deprived the prisoners of their
ability to care for themselves through imprisonment, the state has intentionally taken
on the burden of providing for the prisoners’ basic needs. Thus, any requirement of
intent inherent in the word “punishment” or “cruelty” is sufficiently met by the intent
to carry out the sentence and take on the necessary obligations of prisoner care.
Because, as outlined above, the science has so clearly established that significant
social contacts and opportunity for productive activity are a basic human necessity,
there would be no need under the proposed standard to delve any further into the
“usualness” of the practice. The evidence of what can happen to the body, brain, and
behavior in conditions of extreme isolation; the high rates of prisoners who do
severely deteriorate; and the unpredictability of who among the seemingly resilient
will be among those who suffer severe harm all indicate a high risk of severe harm.
The risk is unnecessary because no vital prison objective requires the extreme
conditions employed.243
However, if a court were to turn to an “unusualness” analysis, it would also find
support for the decision that the practice violates the Eighth Amendment. First, as
explained in the history portion of this Article, the United States abandoned
prolonged or extreme solitary confinement measures in the nineteenth century
because of concerns over their serious mental health implications for the prisoners
(as well as cost implications for the institution—though that point would be irrelevant
to this part of the analysis).244 Thus domestic use of solitary confinement has not
been consistent over time due to its cruel effects. Second, there is a marked
international movement against solitary confinement due to similar concerns.245

240. See Dolovich, supra note 173, at 911–13.
241. Helling, 509 U.S. at 36.
242. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 843–44 (1994).
243. See infra Part IV.A.
244. See supra Part I.
245. See, e.g., Eur. Comm. for the Prevention of Torture & Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, 2nd General Report on the CPT’s Activities Covering the Period 1 January to 31
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Third, there is even the beginning of a movement against the practice in the United
States—as evidenced by the stated positions of politicians in the two Senate hearings
on the issue in 2012 and 2014 and by reforms in places such as Mississippi and
Maine, which will be discussed in the next Part.
Thus, under either the current or a modified standard, common forms of solitary
confinement in the United States are cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment.
IV. ALTERNATIVES
Texas’ administrative segregation units are virtual incubators of psychoses-seeding
illness in otherwise healthy inmates and exacerbating illness in those already
suffering from mental infirmities.
– Judge William Justice246

A. The Policy-Goal Disconnect
Not only is solitary confinement cruel and unusual because it denies minimum
life necessities (and is thus illegal regardless of what legitimate policies it might
promote), but it also fails to significantly advance relevant legitimate policy goals—
including cost savings, institutional safety, public safety, and rehabilitation.
First, as previously mentioned, solitary confinement is far more expensive than
available alternatives. For example, in California the annual cost of keeping a
prisoner in solitary confinement is estimated as $71,000–$78,000, whereas housing
a prisoner in the general population for the same period costs approximately
$58,000.247 In Arizona, the numbers are $50,000 compared to $20,000; in Maryland,
the cost of solitary confinement is three times greater per prisoner; in Ohio, it is twice
as high; in Texas, 45% greater; in Connecticut, nearly twice as high; and in Illinois,
it is three times as high.248 The reasons for this increase in cost include not only space
but also staffing issues, because work done by prisoners in other types of prison
settings (such as cooking and cleaning) must be done by prison staff.249 The physical
and psychological toll of the environment would also presumably increase medical
costs. Note, however, that even if solitary confinement were extremely cost efficient,
such efficiency could not be a basis for overriding the prohibition on denying
minimal life necessities. It would be cost efficient to starve all prisoners, but the
Punishments Clause would not permit it. Cost efficiency is simply one of the multiple
policy goals that solitary confinement fails to advance.

December 1991, pt. 3, para 56, COUNCIL EUR. (Apr. 13, 1992), http://www.cpt.coe.int/en/annual
/rep-02.htm (stating that solitary confinement can rise to the level of inhuman and degrading
treatment and should be as short as possible); Jules Lobel, Prolonged Solitary Confinement and the
Constitution, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 115, 122–23 (2008).
246. Ruiz v. Johnson, 37 F. Supp. 2d 855, 907 (S.D. Tex. 1999), rev’d sub nom. Ruiz v.
United States, 243 F.3d 941 (5th Cir. 2001).
247. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 258 (written statement of Geoffrey
A. Gaskins, Project Director, California Interfaith Campaign on Solitary Confinement).
248. Id. at 130 (written statement of American Civil Liberties Union).
249. See id.
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Second, the evidence does not show that solitary confinement reduces institutional
violence. A study performed in 2003 found solitary-confinement units had no effect on
prisoner-on-prisoner violence in Arizona, Illinois, and Minnesota; they had no impact
in Minnesota, they caused an increase in such violence in Arizona, and they only had
some deterrent effect on prisoner-on-staff violence in Illinois.250 As will be discussed
further, by June 2012 Mississippi witnessed a 50% decrease in violence after
eliminating most of its solitary-confinement units, and Maine witnessed no increase in
violence despite a 70% reduction of such units.251
Finally, solitary confinement has not proved to be an effective means of
rehabilitating the prisoner or deterring future crime. As discussed above, rather than
helping prisoners rehabilitate, solitary confinement may actually cause serious
physical and psychological deterioration.252 Studies also show that prisoners who
reenter society directly from solitary confinement have a higher recidivism rate than
those who spend time in the general population after solitary confinement and before
release. The differential in a national study was 64% versus 41%.253 Also, in a study of
Washington inmates released over a one-year period that controlled for criminal history
and mental health, those that had been released directly from a supermax facility were
significantly more likely to commit felonies and crimes against individuals.254
Indeed, the evidence suggests that solitary confinement may make the public less
safe, because such isolation may “severely impair[] the inmate’s capacity to
reintegrate into the broader community upon release from imprisonment.”255 As one
expert noted, “95% of all incarcerated individuals are eventually released, some
directly out of [solitary confinement] settings. We have succeeded in making those
individuals as sick, as internally chaotic, as we possibly can.”256

250. Chad S. Briggs, Jody L. Sundt & Thomas C. Castellano, The Effect of Supermaximum
Security Prisons on Aggregate Levels of Institutional Violence, 41 CRIMINOLOGY 1341, 1341,
1365–66 (2003).
251. See infra Part IV.B.2–3.
252. See supra Part II.A.
253. JOHN J. GIBBONS & NICHOLAS DE B. KATZENBACH, COMM’N ON SAFETY & ABUSE IN
AM.’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT 55 (2006), available at http://www.vera.org
/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Confronting_Confinement.pdf.
254. David Lovell, L. Clark Johnson & Kevin C. Cain, Recidivism of Supermax Prisoners
in Washington State, 53 CRIME & DELINQ. 633, 644–45 (2007). “A 2007 study of Washington
State’s prison population found that 69 percent of those who were released directly to the
community from solitary—a dishearteningly regular practice—committed new crimes that
landed them back in jail within three years, compared with 46 percent of those who had been
allowed to readjust to the general prison population before release.” Editorial, Solitary Is Cruel
and Unusual, SCI. AM., Aug. 2013, at 10, 10.
255. Grassian, supra note 13, at 333.
256. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 146 (written statement of Shenna
Bellows, Executive Director, Zachary L. Heiden, Legal Director, and Alysia Melnick, Public
Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine) (quoting Maine Hearing, supra
note 232 (statement of Dr. Stuart Grassian)).
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B. Successful and Experimental Models
As these negative effects of solitary confinement have become increasingly
publicized and litigated, officials in some places have taken note and attempted
reforms. This subpart will examine three examples: Britain, Maine, and Mississippi.
1. Great Britain
Great Britain began its reforms at approximately the same time that the United
States was beginning its dive into more and more use of solitary confinement.
Thus, it is a particularly helpful example in terms of looking at the longer-term
effects of reform.
In the 1970s, Britain was dealing with a severe violence problem in its prisons and
was making heavy use of solitary confinement. Because the costs were so high and
the method did not seem to help decrease violence, authorities opted for reform. The
philosophical basis for the new approach was “the simple observation that prisoners
who are unmanageable in one setting often behave perfectly reasonably in another.”257
Officials decided to focus on violence prevention rather than punishment for past
violent behavior. “The British noticed that problem prisoners were usually people for
whom avoiding humiliation and saving face were fundamental and instinctive. When
conditions maximized humiliation and confrontation, every interaction escalated into
a trial of strength. Violence became a predictable consequence.”258
Authorities found that they were able to reduce prison violence by giving
prisoners increased freedoms, incentives, and opportunities rather than threats of
harsher punishments and restraints. A New Yorker article explained:
They reduced isolation and offered them opportunities for work,
education, and special programming to increase social ties and skills.
The prisoners were housed in small, stable units of fewer than ten people
in individual cells, to avoid conditions of social chaos and
unpredictability. In these reformed “Close Supervision Centres,”
prisoners could receive mental-health treatment and earn rights for more
exercise, more phone calls, “contact visits,” and even access to cooking
facilities. They were allowed to air grievances. And the government set
up an independent body of inspectors to track the results and enable
adjustments based on the data.259
The results have been impressive. The use of long-term isolation in England is
now negligible. “In all of England, there are now fewer prisoners in ‘extreme
custody’ than there are in the state of Maine.”260
The final comment above regarding England (with a population of fifty million)
having fewer prisoners in solitary confinement than the state of Maine (with a

257.
258.
259.
260.

Gawande, supra note 87, at 44.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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population of 1.2 million) was actually one of the factors that spurred a movement
for change in Maine.261
2. Maine
When initial attempts to pass legislation reforming solitary confinement policies
in Maine failed, the legislature authorized a study of the issue by representatives from
both the Maine Department of Health and Human Services and the Maine
Department of Corrections. The study included the following findings:
 Prisoners were subjected to solitary confinement for “extraordinary” periods
of time while officials investigated whether the prisoner was the victim or the
perpetrator of a particular offense;
 Prisoners were sometimes kept in solitary confinement simply because the
prison could not find a bed for them in a general population unit;
 The prison underutilized alternative sanctions and incentives for controlling
behavior, which led to overuse of solitary confinement;
 Prisoners were not provided with assistance in responding to accusations of
rule-breaking, which was especially difficult for prisoners with mental illness
or cognitive impairment;
 A number of individuals with apparent symptoms of serious mental illness
were housed in the Special Management Unit, despite policies prohibiting
such housing;
 The prison had too few mental health staff, and mental health screenings and
evaluations were inadequately documented;
 The report noted that reforms might have costs, but that those costs needed to
be viewed in light of the countervailing costs of recidivism, harm to
communities, public safety, and “the simple humanity of what we do.” 262
As a consequence of the study, a newly appointed corrections commissioner
implemented a series of reforms to limit the use of solitary confinement both in terms
of the number of prisoners and the length of each stay. Those reforms included the
following:
 Solitary confinement in Maine is now reserved for the most serious offenses,
and most prisoners are punished in their own units (by losing privileges or
being confined to their own cell within the general population);
 A prisoner cannot be sent to the Special Management Unit for more than three
days without the approval of the Commissioner himself;

261. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 145 (written statement of Shenna
Bellows, Executive Director, Zachary L. Heiden, Legal Director, and Alysia Melnick, Public
Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine).
262. Id. at 150–51 (quoting MENTAL HEALTH/SUBSTANCE ABUSE FOCUS GRP., STATE BD.
OF CORR., FINAL REPORT OF REVIEW OF DUE PROCESS PROCEDURES IN SPECIAL MANAGEMENT
UNITS AT THE MAINE STATE PRISON AND THE MAINE CORRECTIONAL CENTER 4–13 (2011)).
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 When a prisoner is sent to the Special Management Unit, his bed remains
open until he returns;
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have the opportunity to have their
punishment time cut in half through good behavior;
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have an opportunity to interact
with other prisoners and with mental health staff in a group setting, and they
have an opportunity to attend group religious services. Attendance in group
treatment sessions earns the prisoner additional recreation time, which can be
used indoors or outdoors;
 Prisoners are more closely monitored for changes in mental health status;
 Prisoners in the Special Management Unit have access to televisions, radios
and reading material, which alleviate some of the oppressive qualities of
isolation.263
These changes resulted in a 70% reduction in the use of solitary confinement in
the Maine State Prison—with no accompanying increase in violence toward
prisoners or guards.264
3. Mississippi
In Mississippi, Unit 32 was a 1000 bed maximum-security facility where all inmates
were in lockdown in single cells for twenty-three to twenty-four hours per day.265
Lawsuits were pressuring the state to improve conditions at Unit 32; in the spring and
summer of 2007, violence culminated with three homicides, one suicide, and many
disruptive incidents.266 The Commissioner explained that the cultural norm of Unit 32
had become “disruptive as there were no incentives to change behavior. As one
offender told me ‘you took all our hope and we have nothing to lose.’”267
The Commissioner was convinced change was necessary by the deteriorating and
dangerous environment as well as by the “increased litigation.”268 Partnering with
experts from the National Institute of Corrections and the American Civil Liberties
Union, the Department of Corrections developed a classification model using
objective criteria for placement in administrative segregation and requiring an
individualized plan so that every prisoner understood what steps he must take to be
released from solitary and how to increase his privileges. Counseling and education
programs were implemented, including group counseling sessions for those in
solitary (with some innovative methods of restraint to ensure safety). Special steps
were taken to better care for the needs of mentally ill inmates, including employing
specially trained correctional officers for those units housing them.269 Group

263. Id. at 151.
264. Id. at 152.
265. Id. at 54 (written statement of Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the
State of Mississippi).
266. Id. at 55.
267. Id. at 54–55.
268. Id. at 55.
269. Id.
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recreational and congregate dining opportunities were also provided to those that had
been in twenty-three to twenty-four hour isolation.270
Due to these types of reforms, Mississippi was able to close Unit 32 in 2010,
resulting in annual savings of approximately $5.6 million.271 Those housed in solitary
confinement dropped by 75.6% between 2007 and 2012.272 As of June 2012,
Mississippi housed 316 prisoners in solitary confinement units—down from 1300 in
2007. Those 316 constituted 1.4% of the Mississippi prison population.273 This
reduction not only did not cause more violence—there was a 50% drop in violent
incidents that the Commissioner credits to “[t]he administrative segregation reduction
along with the implementation of faith-based and other programs.”274 He also credited
the state’s 27% recidivism rate over a three-year period (one of the lowest in the
country) to the programs implemented in the wake of these reforms, including “Adult
Basic Education, vocational school, alcohol and drug programs, fatherhood education,
and pre-release programs, as well as [the state’s] reentry programs.”275
In oral testimony before a Senate committee, Commissioner Epps explained that there
were three keys to his reforms. First, there must be a genuine, documented classification
system. Second, there must be rehabilitative programs in place. Third, leadership must
have the correct vision of who belongs in solitary confinement—in Mississippi, he said,
any prisoner’s placement in solitary has to be approved by himself and a deputy
director.276 Having strict guidelines for placing people in solitary confinement, he
explained, can help distinguish between “who you are afraid of” versus “who you are
mad at.”277 Only the former, he implied, should spend any time in isolation units.
CONCLUSION: PROPOSED CHANGES AND REAWAKENING TO REHABILITATION
If you treat people like animals, that’s exactly the way they’ll behave.
– Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the State of Mississippi278

From the above examples it is clear that there are many avenues a state could take to
improve conditions and outcomes in this nation’s prisons. States should be free to
experiment with a wide variety of approaches, but “‘[t]here are limits to the extent to
which a [state] may conduct . . . experiments at the expense of the dignity and personality’

270. AMNESTY INT’L USA, STATEMENT PREPARED FOR THE HEARING ON REASSESSING
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (2012), available at http://solitarywatch.com/wp-content/uploads
/2012/06/amnesty-international-usa.pdf.
271. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 56.
272. Id. at 55.
273. Id. at 55–56.
274. Id. at 56.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 19 (statement of Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the State
of Mississippi).
277. Id. at 56 (written statement of Christopher Epps, Commissioner of Corrections for the
State of Mississippi).
278. Goode, supra note 21.
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of the individual.”279 What are those limits? What are the minimum reforms necessary to
avoid cruel and unusual punishment in the context of solitary confinement?
For a system of solitary confinement to survive Eighth Amendment scrutiny, it
cannot deny a minimum human necessity—and creating environments that present a
high risk of severe and unnecessary harm denies a minimum human necessity. It may
be necessary, in the interest of institutional safety, to place a prisoner alone in a cell
temporarily—but being housed alone should not entail denial of access to meaningful
social relationships, nor should it deny access to all rehabilitative programs, nor
should it require excessive sensory deprivation.
Experts who have studied prisoners in solitary confinement have explained that
“[h]uman beings require some degree of social interaction and productive activity to
establish and sustain a sense of identity and to maintain a grasp on reality.”280 Moreover,
isolation does not need to be complete in order to be dangerously
debilitating; it is the absence of “meaningful” social interaction that
destroys a person’s ability to cope. The occasional sight of a guard or
sound of a distant human voice does not qualify, and the increased use
of modern technology (surveillance cameras, timed lights, and remote
locks) . . . have only added to prisoners’ isolation.281
As demonstrated by the science, extreme isolation and sensory deprivation measures
put all inmates at a high risk of severe harm by denying basic human necessities. As
demonstrated by the Britain, Maine, and Mississippi examples, such steps are also
contrary to any legitimate policy goals.
Whether “meaningful social relationships” are provided through regular
counseling, group therapy, outside visitors, participation in rehabilitation programs
that involve human interaction, or other forms of prisoner interaction should be left
to state and prison authorities, within the bounds of what science continues to
indicate is humane. Likewise, precisely how sensory-deprivation issues are
addressed should not be dictated by the Constitution; given the current science,
however, it is likely that prisoners are entitled to more time outside of the cell, some
opportunity for meaningful participation in rehabilitative programs, and some time
outdoors during daylight hours.282
Finally, even under these improved conditions, solitary confinement should not be
indefinite (which seems to needlessly add to a prisoner’s stress and risk of decline)283

279. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 555 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (alteration in
original) (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 546 (1942) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
280. Solitary Confinement Hearing I, supra note 8, at 146 (written statement of Shenna
Bellows, Executive Director, Zachary L. Heiden, Legal Director, and Alysia Melnick, Public
Policy Counsel, American Civil Liberties Union of Maine) (quoting Maine Hearing, supra
note 232 (statement of Dr. Terry Kupers)).
281. Id. (citing Maine Hearing, supra note 232 (statements of Dr. Stuart Grassian and Dr.
Terry Kupers)).
282. See supra Part II.
283. See Thomas B. Benjamin & Kenneth Lux, Constitutional and Psychological
Implications of the Use of Solitary Confinement: Experience at the Maine State Prison, 9
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 83, 84 (1975) (finding that almost every prisoner being held indefinitely
in an isolation unit in Maine had attempted or contemplated suicide in addition to other
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or last for an unreasonable length of time. Studies have shown that even when there is
not total isolation, increased time spent with a restricted group of people in restricted
circumstances will increase the risk of deleterious effects.284 The Supreme Court has
likewise acknowledged that “the length of confinement cannot be ignored in deciding
whether the confinement meets constitutional standards.”285
However, science currently provides no clear basis for setting a precise number
of days that is too long. It has been established that seven days in isolation is
sufficient to cause a decline in brain activity.286 “Mental health experts conclude that
‘[n]o study of the effects of solitary or supermax-like confinement that lasted longer
than 60 days failed to find evidence of negative psychological effects.’”287 And “for
just about all prisoners, being held in isolated confinement for longer than 3 months
causes lasting emotional damage if not full-blown psychosis and functional
disability.”288 But these studies were not performed under the modified conditions
that this Article argues are necessary to meet constitutional standards. The U.N.
special rapporteur on torture, who advocates banning prolonged solitary confinement
in the United States and elsewhere, admitted that he “more or less arbitrarily defined
that as anything beyond 15 days.”289
Rather than set an arbitrary number as a constitutional standard, states should
evaluate the risk of physical and mental decline to their inmates given their own
solitary confinement policies and set reasonable boundaries of which inmates are
made aware. Inmates should know why they are being housed in restricted
conditions, for how long, and any steps necessary on their part to achieve more
freedoms. This would alleviate the unnecessary stress and increased risk of decline
caused by indefinite confinement; it would also address due process concerns beyond
the scope of this Article.290
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These reforms would still allow great room for state experimentation without
crossing the constitutional boundaries drawn by the Eighth Amendment. The reforms
would also immeasurably improve the mental and physical health of inmates. The
consequences of this improved health, as demonstrated by the Mississippi reforms,
may include reducing prison violence and recidivism—thus promoting safer prisons
and a safer public. By reducing the unnecessary use of solitary confinement through
stricter time boundaries, states would also save money and save lives.

